Saturday, January 14, 2006

More than 100 helicopters lost in Iraq in 2005

Army needs $1.2b for chopper replacement
By PAMELA HESS
UPI Pentagon Correspondent

WASHINGTON, Jan. 12 (UPI) -- The U.S. Army is asking the Pentagon for $1.2 billion to replace more than 100 helicopters it lost to hostile fire, accidents and training incidents in 2005, according to senior officials.

Included in that request will be funding for 13 Apache Longbows destroyed in accidents or by enemy attacks, said Brig. Gen. Edward Sinclair, the commander of the U.S. Army Aviation Center at Fort Rucker.

"The enemy has cost us some, we've lost some to terrain," said Sinclair Thursday. "We haven't had them all replaced."

The latest loss was a Black Hawk UH-60 helicopter, its crew of four and eight passengers. It went down Jan. 7 in bad weather in northern Iraq, killing everyone on board. Sinclair said that crash was caused by bad weather, not enemy action.

But Iraq's insurgency does take a toll on the fleet. Each month there are roughly 15 to 20 attacks on Army helicopters with small arms fire, shoulder-launched missiles and improvised explosives; most of them do no hit their targets. However, the prevalence of manpads in Iraq has caused the Army to install cockpit missile warning system suites on its aircraft, said Sinclair.

The money is part of the Army's request for supplemental funding in 2006. The supplemental appropriation request -- now an annual exercise between the Pentagon and Congress -- could reach as high as $100 billion. Not all the money would be for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan; hurricane and natural disaster recovery funds are likely to be included.

The Iraq war costs about $5.5 billion a month. The Afghan war costs just under $1 billion, according to Pentagon estimates. That does not include the cost of buying replacement and additional equipment for troops.

The Iraq war is particularly hard on Army aviation, said Brig. Gen. Stephen Mundt, director of the Aviation Task Force in the Army's operations office. Helicopters and crews have logged more than one million combat hours over the last four years, and choppers are aging three to five times faster than they would in normal peacetime operations. The pace of operations has been five times the standard tempo of operations.

The pace and cost of Army aviation operations is not likely to diminish anytime soon, warned Mundt. While the Army as a whole is looking forward to drawing down its forces in Iraq this year, aviation assets will not be proportionately pulled out. The Iraqi army has no helicopters of its own for close-air support, troop movement or medical evacuation, so those missions will remain with the Americans.

The Army has spent at least $2.6 billion refurbishing some 2,400 aircraft after their tours in Iraq and Afghanistan, taking the helicopters completely apart to fix what's broken and replace what is worn out. There are about 500 aircraft at work in the two wars at any one time.

Sinclair offered one example to demonstrate the difficulty of operating in Iraq: When one already cleaned and stripped helicopter was taken apart to be refurbished, more than 230 pounds of sand sifted out of the cockpit.

Army repair depots are running at 82 percent of their capacity, compared to 50 percent capacity before the war.

Despite the heavy wear and tear, Army officials said the helicopter fleet has held up well: there has not been a single fleet wide grounding order for a mechanical problem.

Army aircraft have a respectable 77 percent mission-capable rate in Iraq, according to Loren Thompson, a defense analyst and President of the Lexington Institute, a Washington, D.C. think tank.

But he warns the pace can not be maintained indefinitely.

"The Bush Administration has done a good job of funding near-term sustainment requirements, but it needs to offer a more complete explanation of how it plans to replace the prematurely aged fleet of combat systems that eventually will depart Iraq," he stated Thursday.

How the FBI Spied on Edward Said

By DAVID PRICE
A CounterPunch Exclusive Investigation
January 13, 2006

The FBI has a long, ignoble tradition of monitoring and harassing America's top intellectuals. While people ranging from Albert Einstein, William Carlos Williams to Martin Luther King have been subjected to FBI surveillance, there remains an under-accounting of the ways in which this monitoring at times hampered the reception of their work.

In response to my request under the Freedom of Information Act, filed on behalf of CounterPunch, the FBI recently released 147 of Said's 238-page FBI file. There are some unusual gaps in the released records, and it is possible that the FBI still holds far more files on Professor Said than they acknowledge. Some of these gaps may exist because new Patriot Act and National Security exemptions allow the FBI to deny the existence of records; however, the released file provides enough information to examine the FBI's interest in Edward Said who mixed artistic appreciations, social theory, and political activism in powerful and unique ways.

Most of Said's file documents FBI surveillance campaigns of his legal, public work with American-based Palestinian political or pro-Arab organizations, while other portions of the file document the FBI's ongoing investigations of Said as it monitored his contacts with other Palestinian-Americans. That the FBI should monitor the legal political activities and intellectual forays of such a man elucidates not only the FBI's role in suppressing democratic solutions to the Israeli and Palestinian problems, it also demonstrates a continuity with the FBI's historical efforts to monitor and harass American peace activists.

Edward Said's wife, Mariam, says she is not surprised to learn of the FBI's surveillance of her husband, saying, "We always knew that any political activity concerning the Palestinian issue is monitored and when talking on the phone we would say 'let the tappers hear this'. We believed that our phones were tapped for a long time, but it never bothered us because we knew we were hiding nothing."

The FBI's first record of Edward Said appears in a February 1971 domestic security investigation of another unidentified individual. The FBI collected photographs of Said from the State Department's passport division and various news agencies. Said's "International Security" FBI file was established when an informant gave the FBI a program from the October 1971 Boston Convention of the Arab-American University Graduates, where Said chaired a panel on "Culture and the Critical Spirit". Most of Said's FBI records were classified under the administrative heading of "Foreign Counterintelligence," category 105, and most records are designated as relating to "IS ­ Middle East," the Bureau's designation for Israel.

Post-Patriot Act alterations of the Freedom of Information Act facilitate the FBI's efforts to keep significant portions of Said's FBI file classified ­ as if concerns with resolving Palestinian sovereignty from twenty or thirty years ago are indelibly linked to Bush's "war on terror". Large sections of Said's file remain redacted, with stamps indicating they remain Classified Secret until 2030, 25 years after their initial FOIA processing. One 1973 "Secret" report is now "exempt from General Declassification Schedule of Executive Order 11652, Exemption Category 2," and is "automatically declassified on indefinite". Such administrative stonewalling diminishes our ability to understand the past and further complicates our ability to document the FBI's role in undermining domestic democratic movements.

In February 1972, New York FBI agents produced a report listing Said's employment at Columbia University, his home address and phone number, including a notation that his home telephone service was provided by New York Telephone Company ­ information that was later used to request listings of all toll calls charged to Said's home phone number. A July 1972 FBI report indicates Said received a phone call from someone who was the subject of intensive FBI surveillance. The NYC agent wrote that "reasons for phone call, activities of the professor, and his sympathies in relation to [blank in the document] matters have not been ascertained".

In the months after the attacks at the 1972 Munich Olympics there was a flurry of FBI interest in Said and other Palestinian Americans. In early October 1972, the NY FBI office investigated Said's background and citizenship information as well as voting, banking and credit records. Employees at Princeton and Columbia Universities gave FBI agents biographical and education information on Said, and the Harvard University Alumni Office provided the FBI with detailed information. As Middle East scholar Steve Niva observes, "looking back, this post-Munich period may have marked an historic turning point when statements in support of the Palestinian cause became routinely equated with sympathies for terrorism."

The FBI spoke with their "Middle East informants" in Boston, Newark and New York to gather information on Said. One report indicated that "several confidential sources who are familiar with Middle East [blank in the document]in the United States were contacted during 1972 and 1973, but were unable to furnish any information pertaining to Edward William Said." During this investigation, FBI agents located and read a 1970 Boston Globe article headlined "Columbia Professor Blames Racist Attitude for Arab-Israeli Conflict".

One FBI report detailed events at the fifth annual convention of the Association of Arab-American University Graduates (AAAUG) held in November 1972 in Berkeley. Said was living in Lebanon at the time and did not attend the conference, but because he was a member of the AAAUG Board of Directors, the FBI included their convention report in his FBI file. There was a significant FBI presence at the conference, and the FBI's released records include the conference program indicating presentations from a selection of Arab-American scholars such as anthropologists Laura Nader and Barbara Aswad.

The extent of the FBI's surveillance of the conference is seen in the FBI's list (provided by a "reliable" FBI informer) of all AAAUG convention's attendees staying at the Claremont Hotel. Why the FBI collected information on conference attendees' accommodations is not clear. Was it to break into participants' rooms to plant listening devices, search for documents, or to monitor attendees? The redacted report does not say, but the FBI's well-documented reliance on such "black bag jobs" during this period raises this as a likely possibility. The Bureau's policy for these illegal operations was to maintain separate filing systems for them. The FBI's report contains summaries of several talks, including a detailed account of Andreas Papandreou's keynote address criticizing "the imperialistic forces of the United Stats against the peoples of the Middle East, Greek and Arab peoples alike."In January 1973, the FBI undertook further criminal and biographical background checks on Said, and the New York Special Agent in Charge recommended in February that the case be closed. But an FBI investigation the next month of a "subject [who had] traveled in the United States in 1971" began a new investigation of Said as one of several individuals whose phone numbers had come to the attention of the FBI and were believed to have possible "connections with Arab terrorist activities." Such alleged connections remain unspecified as do Said's connections to such activities, but such vague associations are frequently used to keep investigations active.

FBI memos from this period discuss the creation of a LHM (Letterhead Memorandum, meaning a memo identified as coming from the FBI) that "should be suitable for dissemination to foreign intelligence agencies". The agency or country to receive this LHM report is not identified, but Israel's Mossad was a likely candidate.

During the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War the FBI collected several of Said's newspaper columns and interviews, and his file includes a New York Times column arguing that Arabs and Jews in the Middle East had historically been pitted against each other rather than against "imperialist powers". In 1974, the FBI received word that Said would speak at the Canadian Arab Federation Conference in Windsor, Ontario, and the Bureau again tracked Said's movements, though an FBI informer indicated that "he did not consider Said to be the type of individual who would be involved in any terrorist activity".

The FBI made no entry in Edward Said's file in 1978, the year of the publication of his groundbreaking book, Orientalism.

A July 1979 FBI report summarized information on thirty-six individuals (names blacked out in the released documents) preparing to attend the August 1979 Palestine American Congress (PAC) at the Shoreham-Americana Hotel in Washington, D.C. The FBI noted that Said was an ex-officio member of the council. Snippets of paragraphs on other unidentified attendees mention past academic and political conferences attended, and one FBI informant is identified as being linked to the "pro-Iraqi Ba'ath Party". FBI offices receiving this report were advised to check their files for pertinent information on any of the mentioned individuals.

The extent of the FBI's conference surveillance is shown in a partially declassified Secret Report Index indicating that attendee records had been consulted from FBI field offices in twenty-five listed cities alphabetically listed from Albany to Washington. This report contains sentence summaries on participants. Said's summary, for example, says, "EDWARD SAID ­ Previously identified as being from Columbia University, New York City, New York, and as being deeply affiliated with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine." Other released passages find the FBI preoccupied with tracing various attendees' PFLP sympathies.

The PAC was perhaps the most open and democratic deliberative effort by displaced American Palestinians to address the goals of the Palestinian struggle. With great concern the FBI documented how the PAC "created a Preparatory Committee that empowered it to prepare a working paper on a proposed constitution for some mechanism for collaborative action".

The FBI noted some internal arguments about the legitimacy of some delegates coming from Arab communities with low Palestinian populations. The FBI reported that one delegate at the Congress "reminded all in attendance that the FBI has no legitimate interest in the activities taking place during the three day convention. There was no reason to be afraid of one's presence at all functions of the PAC." Without irony the FBI then noted with concern that some present used false names to register their hotel rooms.

Following opening remarks by Jawad George, another speaker described in the FBI report as a revolutionary black male named Smith, "ensured the PAC that the black Americans would render assistance to Arab revolution." Other speakers discussed in the FBI report included a member of the Organization of Arab Students and Ramallah Mayor Krim Khlif speaking on efforts to establish a Palestinian State on the West Bank.

The FBI report discussed problems arising at the conference's conclusion when there was "much discussion on just the preamble to the constitution. Strong disagreement on the wording of a sentence concerning return to its national homeland, to national self-determination, and to its national independence and sovereignty in all of Palestine, by the Arab peoples." Fights over the wording of the constitution's preamble continued, and several disputes "almost broke out into fist fights" between rival factions. Said's FBI file contains a copy of the "Proposed Constitution of the Palestine American Congress" that had been distributed to PAC attendees, which the FBI marked as classified "SECRET." This information provided by an FBI informant from this period has now been reclassified under thePatriot Act measures making the document classified "Secret" until the year 2029.

In May 1982, the New York FBI Special Agent in Charge sent a Secret report to FBI Director William Webster saying that Said's name had "come to the attention of the N.Y. [FBI Office] in the context of a terrorist matter." FBI headquarters was then requested "to contact liaison with State Department's Middle East section with regard to their knowledge of Said". A week later, Said's file gained a photograph of him addressing the December 1980 Palestine Human Rights Campaign National Conference. One 1982 newspaper clipping added to the file attempted to connect his wife Mariam Said and the PLO to the funding of a full-page anti-Israel advertisement in the New York Times.

During the summer of 1982 an unidentified individual was arrested and deported from the United States, and the "INS obtained photocopies of all documents in his possession". Among this deported individual's papers was Edward Said's name and home phone number. Documents relating to Said and this deportation are still being withheld and are being vetted under National Security Classification review processes.

On September 3, 1982, FBI Director Webster instructed FBI librarians at Quantico to use their computerized New York Times index to locate all past references to Said. This generated a thirteen-page report containing abstracts of forty-nine NYT articles featuring Edward Said. These articles range from political columns by Said, features about him, to literary book reviews by Said. The New York Times Information Service was long used by the pre-Google FBI to compile dossiers on persons or organizations of interest. Thus did the FBI collected a filtered analysis of Said's writings and public statements formed by the reports and prejudices of Times reporters and editors.

Said's FBI file, in the form in which it reached me, concludes with a few redacted reports (now reclassified until the year 2030) from 1983 and a highly censored Classified Secret memo from August 1991 that ends with the suggestions that the FBI "may desire to contact your Middle East Section for additional information concerning Said".

Curiously, Said's FBI file, as released to me, contains no information on the remaining dozen years of his life. Either the FBI stopped monitoring him, or they couldn'tlocate these files, or they won't release this information or even the fact that the information exists in the files. The latter two possibilities seem far more likely than the first .

It did not matter how frequently or clearly Edward Said declared that he "totally repudiated terrorism in all its forms". The FBI continued to focus its national security surveillance campaign on him. Had the FBI read the Palestine American Congress's proposed constitution placed in Said's file in 1979, they would have seen the group's commitment to upholding the "basic fundamental human and national rights of all people and affirms its opposition to racism in all of its manifestations including Zionism and anti-Semitism". Instead, they kept searching for connections to terrorism.

The FBI's surveillance of Edward Said was similar to their surveillance of other Palestinian-American intellectuals. For example, Ibrahim Abu Lughod's FBI file records similar monitoring ­ though Abu Lughod's file finds the FBI attempting to capitalize on JDL death threats as a means of interviewing Lughod to collect information for his file.

Having read hundreds of FBI reports summarizing "subversive" threads in the work of other academics, I am surprised to find that Said's FBI file contains no FBI analysis of his book Orientalism. This is especially surprising given the claims by scholars, like Hoover Institute anthropologist Stanley Kurtz in his 2003 testimony before the House Subcommittee on Select Education, that Said's post-colonial critique had left American Middle East Studies scholars impotent to contribute to Bush's "war on terror". Given what is known of the FBI's monitoring of radical academic developments it seems unlikely that such a work escaped their scrutiny, and it is reasonable to speculate that an FBI analysis of Orientalism remains in unreleased FBI documents.

But some known things are obviously missing from the released file. Chief among these are records of death threats against Said and records of the undercover police protection he received at some public events. But there are no reasons to withhold such records, and their absence gives further cause to not believe the FBI's claim this is his entire releasable file.

The reasons for the temporal and thematic gaps in Said's file remain unknown. One explanation for such gaps is suggested in Kafka's The Trial, where reference is made to cases of suspects never cleared of vague accusations but who are instead given an "ostensible acquittal" under which the accused's dossier circulates for years, "backwards and forwards with greater or smaller oscillations" on "peregrinations that are incalculable". Perhaps such Kafkaesque forces move within the FBI, empowered by post-9/11 legislation and desires to shield the public's eye from acknowledgments of past persecutions of Edward Said.

David Price is author of Threatening Anthropology: McCarthyism and the FBI's Surveillance of Activist Anthropologists (Duke, 2004). He can be reached at: dprice@stmartin.edu

Real Cost Of Iraq War Dwarfs Government Expenditures

Economists say the Iraq war's true price staggers official estimates when economic factors are added to the tally.
By Kevin G. Hall, Knight Ridder News Service
Miami Herald
January 14, 2006

WASHINGTON - New academic research suggests that the war in Iraq could cost America up to more than $2 trillion.

Congress appropriated $357 billion from 2002 through the end of 2005 for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and related security issues, according to the nonpartisan Congressional Research Service.

But two research papers suggest that those numbers don't tell the whole story. When nonbudget economic factors are added, the true cost to the U.S. economy over the next decade could be anywhere from $657 billion to $2 trillion for the Iraq war alone, these studies estimate.

That's a lot of money; $2 trillion is enough to buy General Motors Corp. about 175 times at current stock prices.

The researchers include what they estimate continued military operations in Iraq will cost over the next decade -- as much as $266 billion, according to the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office.

Estimating human cost

Both papers also place a dollar value on a number of war-related consequences that are hard to measure. For instance, they try to gauge the lost productive capacity of soldiers killed in Iraq or National Guard members taken away from home for protracted tours of duty.

Both estimate the costs of lifetime disability benefits and care for injured service members, assuming, based on past conflicts, that 20 percent have brain injuries and 6 percent amputations. The papers also try to gauge where today's sky-high oil prices would be had there been no war.

Attracting the most attention is a study co-authored by Joseph Stiglitz, a Nobel Prize-winning economist at Columbia University and former chief economist at the World Bank, who's an outspoken critic of the war. In a 36-page paper released this week, Stiglitz and Harvard University lecturer Linda Bilmes argue that the total economic costs of the war dwarf government spending on it.

''Even taking a conservative approach, we have been surprised at how large they are,'' the two wrote. ``We can state, with some degree of confidence, that they exceed a trillion dollars.''

The total could rise to $2 trillion under the less conservative of Stiglitz's two models.

A warning unheeded

Government agencies often conduct such cost analyses when weighing policy options, but the Bush administration did no such analysis before it decided to invade Iraq. Lawrence Lindsey, the director of the White House's National Economic Council, was shown the door after suggesting that it could cost $100 billion to $200 billion. Events have proved that estimate low. Officials said they believed that increased sales of Iraqi oil would pay for much of the cost of rebuilding.

Maybe they should have thought harder, Scott Wallsten suggested. He's a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, a conservative research center, who published a war-costs analysis last September that was just updated.

Wallsten concludes that the cost of the Iraq war to the U.S., beyond spending by Congress, will exceed $300 billion.

''The point of the paper wasn't to take a position on the war. I am hoping to create a framework for evaluation,'' Wallsten said in an interview.

The White House bristled at that.

''The president doesn't approach defending America as an accountant,'' said spokesman Trent Duffy, adding that there are economic benefits from preventing terrorism.

Some analysts, however, argue that the Iraq war is inspiring more Muslim extremists to pursue jihad against America.

The methodology that Stiglitz uses is similar to others who are reaching similar conclusions. One of them was Yale University economist William Nordhaus, who published a detailed paper in December 2002 about what the pending war in Iraq might cost the U.S. economy over the following decade.

His high-end conclusion? About $1.9 trillion.

Why Iraq's Resistance Differs From Insurgency

By Roger Cohen
International Herald Tribune
January 14, 2006

BAGHDAD--Forget the insurgency. We all know about that. It's time to think about the Iraqi resistance, which may hold the key to the success or failure of the great American gamble in Iraq.

What is the resistance and how does it differ from the insurgency? It's the great mass of Sunni Arabs for whom the American invasion turned life on its head. It's the Sunnis toppled by U.S. tanks from a centuries-old dominance and angered by the ascendancy of the long-trampled Shiite majority.

These Sunnis, perhaps 20 percent of the Iraqi population, are the sea in which the double-headed insurgency (part Al Qaeda fanatics, part Saddam irredentists) has thrived. They're the folk who have granted insurgents safe passage, turned a blind eye to myriad acts of sabotage, taken small payments for small services, and generally wished America ill. Resistance can be largely passive but no less effective for that.

Nothing will change the insurgents; they're in this to the death. Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia will not cease its monstrous dream of a restored caliphate, nor stop cutting infidel throats in pursuit of that illusion.

The die-hard Baathists nostalgic for the ancien regime will not stop their murderous quest to restore the comfortable world they knew and loved of lucrative trade monopolies locked in by kill-on-a-whim despotism.

But the Sunni resistance is another story. Like human nature, it's malleable. It's composed for the most part of people who want jobs and a stake in the new Iraq and may start to think differently should those be provided.

If the resistance can be turned, the sea could dry up and the insurgents' lives become arid. It is to this task, very late in the day, that the United States has now turned.

Conversations with American officials and officers here reveal a couple of important new catchphrases. One is "pushing the envelope with the Sunnis." Another is "the Sunni buy-in." The former is supposed to secure the latter.

It may seem bizarre that close to three years have been needed to focus on the resistance, but then America's attempt to change the course of Middle Eastern history through Iraq has been characterized from the outset by a whimsical disregard for the enormity of the upheaval set in motion by the invasion.

Chief among these was the destruction of a Middle Eastern order dominated by Sunni strongmen - one with which the United States had long seemed happy enough so long as the oil flowed - and the propulsion of the downtrodden Shia toward power through a revolutionary idea: one Iraqi, one vote.

The Sunnis were staggered: how could Washington give its backing to the people they disparagingly call the "Iranians" or the "Safavids" (after an old Persian dynasty) because Iran is a Shiite theocracy? Their astonishment was soon accompanied by an implacable anger; the resistance was born.

But Donald Rumsfeld, the U.S. defense secretary, could not see that - those fighting America were mere "bitter-enders" - and he was not alone in his illusions. The ending of a despotic regime was also the ending of an entire social order. Yet America chose to ignore the enormity of its deed.

It was only in recent weeks that President George W. Bush stumbled on the notion that alongside "the Saddamists and terrorists" lurked a category of Iraqis he called "the rejectionists." These, he said in a speech on Dec. 7, are "ordinary Iraqis, mostly Sunni Arabs, who miss the privileged status they had."

What Bush did not say is that the "rejectionists" make up the resistance and, in the words of an official here, the resistance is "a big thing."

Making it smaller is now a chief American policy objective, embraced so determinedly that the Shia are nervous.

Pushing the envelope with the Sunnis has involved reaching out to their leaders; pleading for participation in the Dec. 15 election; beginning the enormous task of recruiting Sunnis to the new Iraqi armed forces dominated by Kurds and Shiites; displaying public anger over abuse of Sunnis in the Shiite-led Interior Ministry; and making it clear that the best hope for Iraq is a centrist, cross-sectarian government.

The belated change of U.S. policy has borne some fruit; a Sunni "buy-in" may be under way, albeit with ambivalence. Votes are still being counted, but Sunni parties are expected to take close to 20 percent of the seats in the new Parliament.

Even in Anbar Province, the heartland of the insurgency, voter turnout was about 55 percent, up from 1 percent in the vote for a transitional authority a year earlier. The shocking thing about the recent suicide bombing in the Anbar town of Ramadi was not the act itself but the fact that 1,000 men lining up for police jobs provided the target. That's 1,000 Sunnis "buying in."

Once the votes are counted, probably by Jan. 25, the horse-trading on a four-year government will begin. Two things are certain: the bargaining will be long and the United States will use all its muscle to ensure a significant Sunni cabinet presence.

The Shia will kick and scream. Already some of their leaders have accused the United States of siding with "the terrorists." But America has learned that the Iraqi resistance is real and must be tackled.

America's message to the Sunnis is now clear: you cannot have one foot in the government and one in the resistance. If you are buying in, you must forsake all support - tacit, passive, mercenary - for the insurgency. Another message: If it comes to an Iraqi civil war the chances of Sunnis winning are remote, so get on board now.

Whether the Sunnis are ready to take that step en masse is not clear. The ties between the resistance and the insurgency are many-layered. But new tensions between Sunni communities and the terrorists suggest a shift.

Revolutions bring resistance. It has taken America a long time to realize its invasion was also a revolution. Better late than never. Resistance, unlike terror, can be defeated.

Friday, January 13, 2006

Maximum territory, minimum Arabs

By Tom Segev
haaretz
13/01/2006

Of all 11 Israel's prime ministers, none has been as admired and as hated as Ariel Sharon. Ben-Gurion was admired by many, but not hated by many. Many hated Golda Meir, and not that many admired her. Menachem Begin was admired and respected, even by people who disagreed with his positions. Moshe Dayan and Ezer Weizman never served as prime minister: Dayan was admired, but he aroused more fear than hate; Ezer Weizman stirred more affection than admiration. Sharon is admired and hated.

This week, everyone swallowed their hatred for Sharon - even the Gush Katif evacuees. Almost everywhere one turned, all that was heard were the voices of admirers. They described him as a good friend, a warm person abounding in humor and charm, an anxious shepherd devoted to the well-being of the sheep on his ranch. Believers went to the Western Wall to pray for his welfare, children sent him drawings and poems, journalists told about the heart-to-heart phone conversations he had with them, late into the night, how he never failed to share in their joys and sorrows, because that's the kind of guy Arik was. The words "hero" and "father" worked overtime.

On occasions like this, the media tends to fall into political kitsch, but this time it also groveled before the tendency of many Israelis to evade responsibility for what is done in their name and to leave "politics" in the hands of a strong leader who doesn't hassle them with the need to participate in decisions. Five years of terror and subjugation, of the economic crisis and the dismantling of the settlements in Gaza - have made Israel a very tired country; so tired that no one had the energy to whip up the withdrawal into a genuine national trauma.

Israelis forgave Sharon when he did the opposite of what he promised them before the elections, and streamed by the masses toward the vague and noncommittal political center that Sharon offered them, with or without Shimon Peres, with or without Dalia Itzik - who cares? Most Israelis also didn't get too worked up when the police informed the court that it had evidence allegedly indicating that Sharon accepted $3 million from an Austrian casino magnate. They wanted to rely on Sharon the way that Sharon has always relied on himself.

Sharon lives in absolute identification with the state; like many of his generation, he identified the state with the army, and identified the army with the national fate. From war to war, and as he climbed ever higher up the IDF ladder of command, Sharon convinced himself that he knows what's good for Israel and what's bad for it and is therefore worthy of leading it: without restrictions, doubts or inhibitions, without compromises and without partners.

He is an Israeli Napoleon, wrote veteran Sharon-watcher Uri Avnery, who was the editor of the weekly Haolam Hazeh. For the past 50 years, Avnery has admired Sharon, and also hated him.

'I don't hate Arabs'

His fame as a military man blossomed in the wars against Egypt, but the son of farmers from Kfar Malal didn't view the Arab armies as the main danger: The big threat was presented by the Arabs who lived in the Land of Israel. "I don't hate Arabs," he said once, "but I certainly have a deep feeling about our historic rights to the Land of Israel and this of course worsens my attitude toward the Arabs." He was referring to Israeli Arabs. They were his main enemy. Civilians or fighters - Sharon made no distinction between them. He viewed both as a threat to Israel's national identity.

In this, Sharon was no different from many others. From the day the Zionist movement began operating in the Land of Israel, it was conscious of the Arabs' resistance. From the day the first pioneers arrived, the Jews here have been arguing among themselves about the right way to live with "the Arab problem." They considered every possibility, everything from transferring the Arabs to another country to forming a binational state; they examined every possibility for dividing the land, but agreed on one fundamental principle: maximum territory, minimum Arabs.

Sharon accepted this principle, but scoffed at the impulse to self-flagellation that from the very beginning gnawed at the activity of the Zionist movement and the State of Israel. "I believe with perfect faith that our survival is contingent upon a decisive insistence on our rights and, when there is a need, we must punish unyieldingly," he said. And he "punished" the Palestinians mercilessly.

The consequences of the Qibya raid that Sharon commanded in 1953 were so horrendous that at first the state tried to deny that the action had been carried out by a regular IDF force. Some 60 Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank village that was then in Jordan were killed; about half of them were women, children and the elderly. Sharon claimed that it happened as a result of a mistake and he was thereafter permitted to continue his service in the army. And the experience taught him that the state did not rule out his approach.

The suppression of the Palestinian population in Gaza in the early 1970s entailed a cruel violation of human rights; some saw it as amounting to war crimes, but again - no one stopped Sharon. He was permitted to continue in his military service and went on believing that he was doing the state a good service.

More than 30 years passed before he was rebuked for what happened to Palestinians on his watch. This was at the end of 1982 when the commission of inquiry investigating the massacre at the Sabra and Chatila refugee camps ruled that Sharon ignored the danger of potential bloodletting when he decided to allow the Lebanese Phalangists into the camps. His responsibility for the massacre forced Sharon to give up his position as defense minister. "Whoever didn't want him as defense minister is going to get him as prime minister," his friend Uri Dan declared, which, of course, is just what happened, and further evidence that Sharon's basic approach to the Palestinians was not alien to his country.

An optimistic illusion

In addition to his war on the Palestinians, Sharon did more than perhaps any other person to build the settlements in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. And therefore, no one did more damage to the chances of dialogue with the Palestinians. In this area, too, Sharon was not alone. After the Six-Day War, everyone agreed that Gaza would remain a part of the State of Israel; the debate over the West Bank was never settled, but still all agreed that there would be no return to the Green Line. Thus, there is no basis for portraying the settlers as "lords of the land" who imposed themselves on the government; many of them came to the territories at the behest of Ariel Sharon.

The withdrawal from Gaza and the dismantling of the settlements spawned the thesis that Sharon had evolved into a different person, into a "new Sharon." This was an optimistic illusion: Sharon remained the person he always was, believing solely in force, not a statesman who suddenly saw the light of peace. Sharon didn't believe in peace with the Palestinians mainly because he was never able to believe the Palestinians. He also held onto the principles of the map he liked to show visitors whom he took on tours of the territories.

The idea was to annex to Israel as much territory as possible along the Green Line and the Jordan Rift Valley and to concentrate the Palestinian population in enclaves that were either completely isolated from one another or connected only by narrow strips of land. Gaza was the first enclave that he created. The main change in his position wasn't in any recognition that the Land of Israel must be divided, but in his readiness to call the Palestinian enclaves a "state." This was the price he had to pay in return for broad, almost unreserved support from President Bush.

The permanent borders that Sharon wanted to establish would require the dismantling of some settlements that were built over the years in the West Bank, including some that contradict the goals of his map. The map didn't require the dismantling of the settlements in Gaza and therefore it wasn't Sharon the statesman who gave the order for them to be dismantled, but Sharon the army man, who reckoned that the price of the war on terror wasn't worth it. His removal of the settlers was a reflection of David Ben-Gurion's basic axiom: Man is nothing, the state is everything.

'A legend in uniform'

All of our prime ministers, including David Ben-Gurion, left behind documentary material that is not yet open to public scrutiny. Sharon kept notes, perhaps even a diary, and in the coming years, there will undoubtedly be many revelations about his actions and failures, everywhere from Dimona to Ramallah.

It's not easy to say what makes a person choose a military career; most Israelis have served in the army, but didn't choose to make the army their career. Those who did are therefore different somehow from the rest, in their psychological makeup, for one thing; often, army service is the fulfillment of a passion. Sharon once talked about how he felt during one of the military operations he took part in as a young man: "It was a moonlit night and I looked back and saw this huge column marching behind me. It gives a great feeling of power, of strength." The strength that Sharon radiated engendered both admiration and hatred.

Sharon fought in the country's War of Independence; he was wounded at Latrun. This week, an old man who saved Sharon's life all those years ago came to Hadassah Hospital and, naturally, his visit was followed by the cameras. He was permitted to go up to the seventh floor and when he returned, he reported happily that he'd seen Gilad.

The direct human connection to the state's beginnings contains, in itself, a certain enchantment. Sharon earned admiration not only because of the heroism attributed to him, but also because of the continuity that he conveys by virtue of the fact that he was there when the state was born; his roots are planted in the place where David Ben-Gurion stood. This bolstered his image as the last of the legendary giants.

As a paratroop commander, Sharon epitomized the invincible youthful masculinity that so many Israelis wished to claim for themselves or instill in their sons, the erect bearing and rootedness they sought to cultivate in place of the weakness and detachment they saw in Diaspora Jewry. "If a paratrooper knew that he was still alive as the result of an escape or a retreat, he would have only contempt for himself. He would see his life as worthless," wrote one journalist in the late 1960s.

On the eve of the Six-Day War, the country was in the grip of a terrible anxiety; the Holocaust was on the minds of many. The victory was perceived as a salvation from destruction and won Sharon much glory. "A legend in uniform," Geula Cohen called him in 1967. "He gives you the feeling that he is each and every one of the people, bigger and smarter and more handsome." Cohen was in awe of his silvery head, his solid shoulders, his strong chest, his eyes and his smile. The Yom Kippur War abruptly shattered the excessive self-confidence imparted by the Six-Day War and Sharon again emerged as a hero and savior. The bandage wrapped around his forehead because of his war injury became his symbol for a while, almost like the black patch that was the emblem of Moshe Dayan.

This week, one of the television networks in Europe offered the theory that the end of Sharon's career marks the end of the era of generals in Israeli politics. This is not so. It's true, though, that Sharon was one of the most political military officers and one of the most military politicians Israel has ever known. When he was still in the army, he used to maintain direct contact with politicians, including Ben-Gurion, who saw him as the embodiment of the new, secular Hebrew hero: "Much is yet in store for you," Ben-Gurion wrote to him, though he also noted in his diary that Sharon had a habit of lying to him.

As the Six-Day War grew more imminent, Sharon frequently meddled in politics in order to hasten the start of the war, and when he lost patience, he suggest that Rabin lock the whole government in one room and launch the war without awaiting their decision. After the Yom Kippur War, he immersed himself in the war of the generals, which was very political, and by the time of the Lebanon War, Sharon was already more of a politician than a military leader.

But Sharon isn't ending the "era of the generals" in Israeli politics because there never was such an era. In the decades since the days of Ben-Gurion, Israeli has had a number of prime ministers who were professional, life-size politicians, such as Moshe Sharett and Benjamin Netanyahu, and Sharon's potential successors are similar in that way: Not one of them has come into politics from the army.

The most prominent military man in Israeli politics was Dayan, but he was an exception: Many military people have tried their hand at politics, but only a few managed to leave their mark. Most didn't get far in politics. Many failed at it and were subsequently all but forgotten: Chiefs of Staff Yigael Yadin, Haim Bar-Lev, Mordechai Gur, Rafael Eitan and Amnon Shahak; Generals Aharon Yariv, Mati Peled, Rehavam Ze'evi, Yitzhak Mordechai, Ori Orr, Amram Mitzna - and countless others.

In recent years, the defense establishment has sent some new people into politics, people like Shaul Mofaz, Ami Ayalon, Uzi Dayan and Avi Dichter: Not one of them comes across as a particularly impressive leader.

Of Israel's 11 prime ministers, only three entered politics after a military career - Yitzhak Rabin, Ehud Barak and Ariel Sharon. Rabin and Barak integrated into the apparatus of the parliamentary administration as civilian politicians; Sharon remained an army man his whole life. Somehow he managed to stay above party politics in the public consciousness: Many Israelis identified him with the state itself.

Sharon's first foray into politics was a failure. His Shlomzion experience showed him the swampy nature of the party system. He scoffed at the limitations of democracy and then resigned from the Likud. Kadima pledged, among other things, "to change the regime" in Israel, that is, to introduce a regime of one man, Sharon himself. He leaves behind a state that could arrive at elections consumed by one of the biggest dangers to democracy: boredom.

Between Paris and Jerusalem

Sharon's hospitalization has prompted the media to pore over its very favorite topic: itself. A few weeks ago, the newspapers criticized the Prime Minister's Office for releasing information regarding the prime minister's condition that was too partial and too late. Now the newspapers are asking if they didn't go overboard in their reporting. Between that peculiar French general with the funny hat and the scratchy voice who came out to the media once a day to say he had nothing to say about the condition of Yasser Arafat '(who was already dead, apparently') and Professor Shlomo Mor-Yosef who is so credible and matter-of-fact, I think I actually prefer Motti Ravid of Channel 10, who is capable of explaining the information given by the hospital and, most important, is also sometimes capable of saying that he doesn't know any more than what Sharon's doctors say.

For the past week, Israel's citizens have been like the patient's relatives sitting in the waiting room, waiting to hear what his doctors say. They want to know everything and have a right to know everything. They also need to know if the doctors caring for their relative erred in the diagnosis or treatment. At the same time, they don't need gossip from doctors unassociated with the case, whose names aren't even known. Not at all.

Israeli and U.S. Strategic talks held

Israeli and U.S. defense officials held a new round of strategic talks.

The 38th meeting of the Joint Political Military Group was held Wednesday in Tel Aviv in what Israeli officials called “a warm and friendly atmosphere.” The sides discussed a range of topics including global and regional challenges and maintaining Israel’s regional military edge.

Attending on behalf of the United States were John Hillen, assistant secretary of state, and Peter Rodman, assistant secretary of defense. The Israeli side was headed by Jacob Toren, director-general of the Defense Ministry.

Fighters deploy

By Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough
The Washington Times
January 13, 2006

Coinciding with increased tensions with Iran over the resumption of illicit uranium enrichment, the U.S. Air Force has dispatched additional warplanes to the region in a not-so-subtle sign, military sources say.
An entire wing of F-16s, the Air National Guard's 122nd Fighter Wing based in Fort Wayne, Ind., left for a base in southwest Asia on Tuesday. A wing is usually about 72 aircraft and several hundred support personnel.
F-16s and support personnel from the 4th Fighter Squadron of the 388th Fighter Wing based at Hill Air Force Base, Utah, also deployed recently to Iraq. The squadron has 12 F-16s.
Both units' F-16s could be used in any military operation to take out Iranian nuclear facilities.
A spokesman for the U.S. Central Command Air Forces, which runs air operations in the region, said the F-16 deployment of about 80 jets is part of a rotation and is not related to Iran's uranium reprocessing.

'Munich,' the Travesty

By Charles Krauthammer
The Washington Post
Friday, January 13, 2006; A21

If Steven Spielberg had made a fictional movie about the psychological disintegration of a revenge assassin, that would have been fine. Instead, he decided to call this fiction "Munich" and root it in a historical event: the 1972 massacre by Palestinian terrorists of 11 Israeli athletes at the Olympic Games. Once you've done that -- evoked the killing of innocents who, but for Palestinian murderers, would today be not much older than Spielberg himself -- you have an obligation to get the story right and not to use the victims as props for any political agenda, let alone for the political agenda of those who killed them.

The only true part of the story is the few minutes spent on the massacre. The rest is invention, as Spielberg delicately puts it in the opening credits, "inspired by real events."

By real events? Rubbish. Inspired by Tony Kushner's belief (he co-wrote the screenplay) that the founding of Israel was a "historical, moral, political calamity" for the Jewish people.

It is an axiom of filmmaking that you can only care about a character you know. In "Munich," the Israeli athletes are not only theatrical but historical extras, stick figures. Spielberg dutifully gives us their names -- Spielberg's List -- and nothing more: no history, no context, no relationships, nothing. They are there to die.

The Palestinians who plan the massacre and are hunted down by Israel are given -- with the concision of the gifted cinematic craftsman -- texture, humanity, depth, history. The first Palestinian we meet is the erudite translator of poetry giving a public reading, then acting kindly toward an Italian shopkeeper -- before he is shot in cold blood by Jews.

Then there is the elderly PLO member who dotes on his 7-year-old daughter before being blown to bits. Not one of these plotters is ever shown plotting Munich, or any other atrocity for that matter. They are shown in the full flower of their humanity, savagely extinguished by Jews.

But the most shocking Israeli brutality involves the Dutch prostitute -- apolitical, beautiful, pathetic -- shot to death, naked, of course, by the now half-crazed Israelis settling

private business. The Israeli way, I suppose.

Even more egregious than the manipulation by character is the propaganda by dialogue. The Palestinian case is made forthrightly: The Jews stole our land and we're going to kill any Israeli we can to get it back. Those who are supposedly making the Israeli case say . . . the same thing. The hero's mother, the pitiless committed Zionist, says: We needed the refuge. We seized it. Whatever it takes to secure it. Then she ticks off members of their family lost in the Holocaust.

Spielberg makes the Holocaust the engine of Zionism and its justification. Which, of course, is the Palestinian narrative. Indeed, it is the classic narrative for anti-Zionists, most recently the president of Iran, who says that Israel should be wiped off the map. And why not? If Israel is nothing more than Europe's guilt trip for the Holocaust, then why should Muslims have to suffer a Jewish state in their midst?

It takes a Hollywood ignoramus to give flesh to the argument of a radical anti-Semitic Iranian. Jewish history did not begin with Kristallnacht. The first Zionist Congress occurred in 1897. The Jews fought for and received recognition for the right to establish a "Jewish national home in Palestine" from Britain in 1917 and from the League of Nations in 1922, two decades before the Holocaust.

But the Jewish claim is far more ancient. If the Jews were just seeking a nice refuge, why did they choose the malarial swamps and barren sand dunes of 19th-century Palestine? Because Israel was their ancestral home, site of the first two Jewish commonwealths for a thousand years -- long before Arabs, long before Islam, long before the Holocaust. The Roman destructions of 70 A.D and 135 A.D. extinguished Jewish independence but never the Jewish claim and vow to return home. The Jews' miraculous return 2,000 years later was tragic because others had settled in the land and had a legitimate competing claim. Which is why Jews have for three generations offered to partition the house. The Arab response in every generation has been rejection, war and terrorism.

And Munich. Munich, the massacre, had only modest success in launching the Palestinian cause with the blood of 11 Jews. "Munich," the movie, has now made that success complete 33 years later. No longer is it crude, grainy TV propaganda. "Munich" now enjoys high cinematic production values and the imprimatur of Steven Spielberg, no less, carrying the original terrorists' intended message to every theater in the world.

This is hardly surprising, considering that "Munich's" case for the moral bankruptcy of the Israeli cause -- not just the campaign to assassinate Munich's planners but the entire enterprise of Israel itself -- is so thorough that the movie concludes with the lead Mossad assassin, seared by his experience, abandoning Israel forever. Where does the hero resettle? In the only true home for the Jew of conscience, sensitivity and authenticity: Brooklyn.

Bush participates in a reconstruction efforts in New Orleans



U.S. President George W. Bush participates in a reconstruction efforts roundtable with small business owners and community leaders while visiting New Orleans January 12, 2006. The president is touring the Gulf Coast region to witness efforts to rebuild the region after Hurricane Katrina destroyed many parts of the area last year. REUTERS/Larry Downing

Annan wants US, Europe to consider force in Darfur

Reuters
13 Jan 2006

UNITED NATIONS, Jan 12 (Reuters) - The United Nations is considering a tough mobile force to police Sudan's Darfur region and hopes the United States and European military will help stop the bloodshed, rape and plunder, Secretary-General Kofi Annan said on Wednesday.

But Annan said that first the Sudan government, the 15-member Security Council and the African Union, which has sent the only foreign troops to Darfur, had to agree to a U.N. operation.

"We need to get the (Sudan) government to work with us in bringing in an expanded force with troops from outside Africa, because until recently it has maintained that it will only accept African troops," Annan told reporters. "But I think we have gone beyond that now."

Annan spoke after a lunch with Security Council members where Darfur was the main topic.

"As you know, the killings are going on, the rapes are going on," Annan said. "We have lost access to some of the needy people."

"Obviously the international community cannot allow that situation to go unaddressed, and in all likelihood will have to look at other options, including possibly the U.N. working with the African Union to address the situation. "

He said any new force would have to be a mobile one with tactical air support, helicopters and "the ability to respond very quickly."

Asked if this would include rich countries, like the United States and European nations, Annan said, "Those are the countries with the kind of capabilities we will need, so when the time comes, we will be turning to them."

"We will need very sophisticated equipment, logistical support. I will be turning to governments with capacity to join in that peacekeeping operation if we were to be given the mandate," he said.

AU CONSIDERS HAND OVER TO UN

According to U.N. officials, the African Union would either stay in place or become part of a U.N. peacekeeping operation. At the moment, the African Union has only enough money to sustain its operation until March, with the U.S. Congress having denied it another $50 million in aid.

Annan said the African Union needed money now "and they need it quickly" because any U.N. takeover would take months.

About 6,000 AU soldiers are trying to stop escalating violence in Darfur, a desert region the size of France, with a mandate to monitor cease-fire violations but limited powers to intervene. A decision on the future of the force will be made at an AU summit on Jan. 23-24, coincidently held in Khartoum.

In the Ethiopian capital of Addis Ababa on Thursday, the African Union indicated it might hand over the operation to the world body because of a lack of funds.

"The time has come to make a pronouncement on the future of the AU Mission in Darfur and the ways and means to adapt it to the present challenges, including the hand over to the United Nations at the appropriate time," said a report by the AU Peace and Security Council, obtained by Reuters.

The Darfur conflict began in February 2003 when rebels launched an uprising against Khartoum, accusing the government of marginalizing the impoverished area. The government in turn dispatched Arab militias to put down the rebellion, but they have been the main perpetrators of rape, looting and murder.

But Annan said that the rebels now were also attacking people and warned them to take seriously negotiations now being held with the Khartoum government in Abuja, Nigeria.

Catholic Bishops Urge U.S. To Transition Out Of Iraq

Los Angeles Times
January 13, 2006

In a statement sent to Bush and Congress, Catholic prelates avoid the word 'withdrawal,' but say American troops should leave 'sooner than later.'

By Larry B. Stammer, Times Staff Writer

Declaring that the United States was at a crossroads in Iraq, the nation's Roman Catholic bishops said Thursday the time had come to withdraw U.S. troops as fast as responsibly possible and to hand control of the country to Iraqis.

"Our nation's military forces should remain in Iraq only as long as it takes for a responsible transition, leaving sooner than later," said Bishop Thomas G. Wenski of Orlando, Fla., speaking for the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops.

Wenski, chairman of the bishops Committee on International Policy, said recent statements by the Bush administration that troop levels would be reduced were not enough. He said the U.S. must send an unmistakable signal that the goal was not to occupy Iraq "for an indeterminate period," but to help Iraqis assume full control of their government.

The eight-page statement, in the works for months and delivered to the White House and members of Congress on Thursday, was candid in its assessment of the war, which U.S. bishops and the late pope, John Paul II, had opposed from the start.

It underscored failures but also highlighted successes in the nearly three years since the U.S.-led invasion. Weapons of mass destruction were not found; more than 2,200 American troops and tens of thousands of Iraqis have been killed; U.S.-held prisoners were tortured and mistreated; and violence was continuing in the streets.

The bishops said they remained "highly skeptical" of Bush's doctrine of "preventive war." But they also saw signs of hope, including the Iraqi elections.

"Our nation cannot afford a shrill and shallow debate that distorts reality and reduces the options to 'cut and run' versus 'stay the course,' " Wenski wrote, speaking for the bishops conference.

In an interview Thursday, Wenski said the bishops purposely decided to avoid the word "withdrawal" in favor of "transition" to avoid the impression that bishops were advocating that the U.S. "cut and run."

"No matter what the debate might have been about going into Iraq, now that we are there, our presence gives us a whole set of new moral obligations that we have to try to fulfill in a responsible way," Wenski said.

"Our nation is at a crossroads in Iraq," the statement said. "We must resist a pessimism that might move our nation to abandon the moral responsibilities it accepted in using force, and might tempt us to withdraw prematurely from Iraq without regard for moral and human consequences.

"We must [also] reject an optimism that fails to acknowledge clearly past mistakes, failed intelligence, and inadequate planning related to Iraq, and minimizes the serious challenges and human costs that lie ahead," it said.

John Carr, a senior staffer on the Catholic bishops committee, said the statement was intended to set the stage for what bishops hoped would be a vigorous but civil discussion on what the U.S. must do next.

"Candidly, there seems to be more talk on Sunday morning TV talk shows than there is in the Congress or within the Bush administration, at least in the public sense," Carr said. "The great temptation is to try to justify past policies instead of acknowledging where we are and what we need to do."

On Thursday, Catholic bishops forcefully restated their abhorrence to torture and said the U.S. must live up to constitutional protections against cruel and unusual punishment, and abide by international accords outlawing torture.

Bishops were careful not to criticize U.S. troops. By raising "grave moral questions" about the decision to invade Iraq, bishops said they were not questioning "the moral integrity of those serving in the military."

Bishops also called for religious freedoms in Iraq, including tolerance for non-Muslims, and the protection of Iraqi refugees and asylum seekers.

They said that as the U.S. pursued the war on terrorism and the rebuilding of Iraq, it should not forget pressing concerns at home and abroad, particularly caring for the poor.

Israel Wants West To Deal More Urgently With Iran

By Steven Erlanger
New York Times
January 13, 2006

TEL AVIV, Jan. 12 - With Iran's president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, calling for Israel to be "wiped off the map," Israeli officials have special reasons for concern now that Iran has defied the West and said it will resume enriching uranium.

The Israelis are engaged in a careful effort to press the United States and the Europeans to deal more urgently with Iran. Israel has no intention for now of trying to deal with Iran alone or through military means, officials say.

But Israeli officials are worried that politicians in the United States and Europe are focusing on estimates of when Iran might actually have a bomb - rather than concentrating on the "point of no return," perhaps within the next year, when they argue Iran may gain enough technical knowledge to make the fissile material needed for a weapon. After that point, in the Israeli view, it is simply a matter of time until Iran is nuclear-armed.

Maj. Gen. Aharon Zeev-Farkash, who retired Jan. 5 as Israel's director of military intelligence, said Israel believed that the moment was no more than a year away, although estimates differ among governments, based on different views of how advanced Iranian technology has become. Once Iran starts enriching uranium, the general said, it will need just six months to a year to achieve the ability to produce fissile materials.

In a report released Thursday, David Albright and Corey Hinderstein of the Institute for Science and International Security described a number of technical problems Iran had to solve before it could begin testing its enrichment technology.

"Absent major problems," they wrote, "Iran will need roughly six months to one year to demonstrate successful operation" of its pilot operation. "Iran could have its first nuclear weapon in 2009," they went on to say, though they noted that that estimate "reflects a worst case assessment, and thus is highly uncertain."

General Farkash had a similar estimate, saying that within another two and a half to three years, Iran will have enough fissile material for a nuclear bomb, if it is able to construct and run 2,000 to 4,000 centrifuges, the machines that enrich uranium.

"We have a crucial six months to a year to do something," he said, adding that "unfortunately when I say this to our friends and allies, they like to focus on the third step," the production of the bomb, "rather than the first step."

"The first step is the most crucial, when Iran will achieve independent research and development capacity to enrich uranium - we all agree," the general said. "Then it's not an intelligence problem, but a political decision."

Iran's announcement has sent governments scurrying to come up with estimates about how much time they have left until Iran can produce its first nuclear weapon. The Israelis say they think that Iran can produce its first bomb within four to five years. European officials estimate a weapon will take five years, and American officials have offered estimates of 6 to 10 years.

Gary Milhollin, director of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control in Washington, is skeptical about the American estimate.

He said that "what's important is the ability to build a successful centrifuge and get it to work in a cascade," a series of 164 centrifuges, and then tie a series of cascades together.

"People feel the Iranians can do that now," he said. "But whether they've done it or not is less clear." He said his own sources thought that the Iranians could solve the various technical problems.

"How long will it take? No one really knows," Mr. Milhollin said. "But I think that if the Iranians decide to go all out, they could make a bomb's worth of material a year with 2,000 centrifuges running."

He viewed Israel's estimates as a sophisticated form of lobbying, but said he thought that the Israeli estimates were not out of line. "I'd be surprised if the Iranians don't make it in five years with one, two or three bombs," he said.

The problem for intelligence agencies, General Farkash said, is that "while we have hard evidence about a lot of things" supporting Iran's intention to make nuclear weapons, "we don't have the smoking gun" proving that Iran is violating its pledge to enrich for civilian use only.

He said: "So I told my people, we have to bring for the States and everyone the smoking gun. And then they have to face it and decide what to do."

Intelligence assumptions are not enough these days, the general said. "We as intelligence chiefs need to bring a smoking gun if we want to influence policy makers, especially after Iraq," he said, alluding to the fact that assertions that Saddam Hussein possessed an active program to make nuclear and other prohibited weapons, used to justify the invasion of Iraq, proved to be wrong.

Meir Dagan, the chief of Israel's espionage service, Mossad, recently testified before the Israeli Parliament's foreign affairs and defense committee in similar terms. He said that Iran would attain technological independence in producing fissile material in "a matter of months" and that subsequent development of a nuclear bomb would be only a matter of time and the number of centrifuges Iran could operate.

He emphasized Israel's view that "there exists a strategic Iranian decision to reach nuclear independence and the capability to produce bombs," no matter what the Iranians say, and that Iran will produce a number of them.

General Farkash, Mr. Dagan and Israeli policy makers all agree that a military option against Iran's nuclear facilities cannot be ruled out. Lt. Gen Dan Halutz, the Israeli chief of staff, said recently that the West had the ability to destroy the main elements of Iran's nuclear program.

But Israel believes that diplomatic efforts at preventing or at least delaying Iran's ability to produce nuclear weapons should continue with more intensity - at the United Nations Security Council, through economic sanctions, because of Iran's heavy reliance on imported parts, but also through an oil embargo or other means to affect the Iranian government and population.

"Economic sanctions take too long, but we can blockade oil and use Western strategic reserves," said Efraim Inbar, director of the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies at Bar-Ilan University. "Let the Iranians and the government feel some heat. Right now they don't feel any heat. Oil is just money, so let the Americans put their money where their mouth is."

The diplomatic process has already delayed Iran's program by some two years, the Israelis believe.

Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, speaking on Jan. 3, in his last interview before his stroke, made the same case as General Farkash and Mr. Dagan. "In any event, time is not working in favor of anyone who wants to prevent Iran from becoming nuclear," he said. Israel, Mr. Sharon said, "is not the spearhead, but we are working together when it comes to intelligence and evaluation with the United States, together with European countries."

Israel is also being careful not to react too strongly to the violently anti-Semitic comments of the Iranian president, Mr. Ahmadinejad.

David Menashri, the director of the Center of Iranian Studies at Tel Aviv University, said: "The less Israelis speak about Iran the better. Ahmadinejad is trying to turn the Iranian nuclear issue into the problem of Israel, and by responding to his statements we just play into his hands."

German Spies Deny Guiding U.S. Bomb Raids In Iraq

January 12, 2006

BERLIN (Reuters) - Germany's foreign intelligence agency denied on Thursday reports its spies in Baghdad had helped U.S. warplanes select bombing targets during the invasion of Iraq, which the Berlin government had strongly opposed.

Opposition politicians seized on the report as evidence the then government of Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder had secretly backed the U.S.-led war while making political capital from condemning it in public.

Some demanded an investigation of the security services' role, both in Iraq and in the wider U.S.-led war on terrorism.

``If the reports are confirmed, the previous government can no longer state that it didn't take part in the Iraq war,'' said Juergen Koppelin, a liberal Free Democrat member of parliament.

German agents in Baghdad at the start of the Iraq war ``gave us direct support. They gave us information for targeting,'' NDR television quoted a former U.S. military official as saying.

He said that on April 7, 2003 -- 18 days after the U.S. bombing began -- the Americans had received a report that a convoy of Mercedes cars, one of them possibly carrying Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, had been sighted in a Baghdad suburb.

The ex-Pentagon official said the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency asked the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), Germany's foreign spy service, to send one of its Baghdad agents to the suburb of Mansur to check the tip.

After he confirmed the presence of the convoy, the report said, a U.S. plane dropped four bombs on the target area, killing at least 12 civilians, according to the report.

A BND spokesman confirmed the presence of two German intelligence agents in Iraq before and during the U.S.-led invasion. But he said the report, also published in the newspaper Sueddeutsche Zeitung, was ``false and distorted.''

``Contrary to allegations ... we have to record for our part that no target data or bombing coordinates were made available to the parties conducting the war,'' the spokesman said.

The report threatened to embarrass Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, who as chief of staff to Schroeder had oversight of the security services at the time.

Asked if the Schroeder government knew of any BND support for the U.S.-led war, Steinmeier told reporters simply: ``No.''

Schroeder was elected to a second term in 2002 on a platform of strong opposition to the looming war in Iraq, declaring that Germany would not take part in any military ''adventure'' there.

The new report surfaced on the day his successor Angela Merkel, was heading to Washington to meet President George W. Bush for the first time since taking office last November. Her conservatives were in opposition at the time of the war and Merkel now heads a coalition with Schroeder's Social Democrats.

A German security source, speaking on condition of anonymity, acknowledged the BND had shared information with the United States during the bombing phase of the war, but only to identify ``non-targets'' such as embassies, schools and hospitals in order to spare them from being hit.

He said other countries' agents had done the same, mindful of the mistaken targeting of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade during NATO's bombing of Serbia in 1999.

Opposition Greens parliamentary leader Renate Kuenast said German help in U.S. bombing raids would be a ``monstrous action.''

The report fueled pressure which has been building on the government for weeks to allow an inquiry into the role of Germany's security services in the U.S.-led war on terrorism.

The government confirmed for the first time last month that German security officials had questioned detainees at the U.S. prison camp in Guantanamo Bay in Cuba and had also interviewed a German-Syrian terrorist suspect in a Syrian prison in 2002.

The latter meeting took place at a time when the government had told the man's lawyer it had no idea of his whereabouts and had no access to him.

Steinmeier was also forced last month to defend the Schroeder government's handling of the case of Khaled el-Masri, a German citizen who was held by the United States for five months in an Afghan prison before being released in May 2004.

After Handover, Hussein Palaces Looted

November Transfer Ceremony Was Hailed as Symbol of Progress in Iraq
By Ellen Knickmeyer
Washington Post Foreign Service
Friday, January 13, 2006; A01

BAGHDAD, Jan. 12 -- On Nov. 22, the top U.S. military and civilian leaders in Iraq handed over Saddam Hussein's most lavish palace compound to the safekeeping and control of the new Iraqi army and government, in a ceremony whose intended symbolism was as impossible to ignore as the military brass band.

"The passing of this facility is a simple ceremony that vividly demonstrates the continuing progress being made by the Iraqi government and their people," said Col. Mark McKnight, commander of 1st Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division, who handed the keys to the palaces to the governor of Salahuddin province.

But in the days after American forces and the Iraqi brass band pulled out of the circular palace drive on a bluff overlooking the Tigris River, local officials now say, looters moved in, ripping out doors, air conditioners, ceiling fans and light-switch plates from some of the compound's 136 palaces, leaving little more than plaster and dangling electric wires.

The culprits are some of the same Iraqi security forces and officials to whom Americans transferred control, police and the governor say.

"Thank God we were able to save the walls from the looters, because everything else was stolen," Gov. Hamed Hamood Shekti said by telephone.

Shekti, like police officials, blamed Iraqi soldiers at the palaces and his own deputy. "The palace was turned over to the Iraqi army units in the presence of Deputy Governor Abdullah Naji Jabara," he said. "Two weeks later I heard the place was looted. Now who can I accuse of the looting?"

Iraqi army commanders in and around Tikrit could not be reached by telephone for comment. Local authorities said Jabara had left on a pilgrimage to Mecca and could not be reached either.

The full extent of the alleged looting could not be determined. A provincial police commander, Lt. Col. Mahmud Hiazza, said soldiers and officials stripped at least some palaces that had been occupied by U.S. officials. "Also, there were some palaces not occupied by Americans," he said. "Even in those palaces, everything was gone."

A trip to one of the palaces appeared to substantiate the allegations. A witness, visiting one palace now used by Iraqi police, found officers working in offices stripped of their baseboards and doors, with holes where some air conditioners had sat and plaited wiring in place of electrical switches.

According to local officials, the Iraqi troops responsible for the alleged pillaging came from elsewhere, including the northern city of Mosul.

Over several days after the transfer of control from U.S. to Iraqi hands, furnishings from the palaces turned up in one local market for sale by the truckload, said a Tikrit resident, Rashid Juburi.

U.S. military spokesmen, some expressing surprise, said this month that they had not known of the alleged looting spree after the handover. They stressed that the Tikriti palaces, after Baghdad's Green Zone the most prominent U.S. installations eventually slated for return to Iraqi authority, were no longer U.S. troops' concern.

"I think what we're seeing as we're able to leave the areas and turn them over to the Iraqi government, we're giving more responsibility back to the Iraqi government," said Lt. Col. Barry Johnson, a U.S. military spokesman in Baghdad.

Johnson said he could appreciate the symbolism of the alleged looting taking place immediately after the much-ballyhooed handover.

"We would fully expect the Iraqi authorities to address any criminal activities" involved in the stripping of the Tikriti palaces, he said.

Lt. Col. Edward Loomis, a spokesman for the 101st Airborne Division in Tikrit, said he knew of no U.S. service members who had been in the compound since the handover.

A succession of U.S. military units used the palaces as a base after U.S. troops entered Iraq in March 2003. The 1,000-acre compound includes some of the most impressive scenery in Iraq, with sweeping views of the Tigris River valley. Hussein was born in a village outside Tikrit.

Gen. George W. Casey Jr., commander of U.S. forces in Iraq, and U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad were among the dignitaries who choppered out to Tikrit for the handover ceremony in November. In addition to the high-ranking officials in attendance, the event was notable for an incoming mortar round that sent dignitaries, brass band members and many of the soldiers diving to the asphalt.

The round, a dud, overshot the ceremony by hundreds of feet.

Shekti, the governor, said in his remarks that day that the handover highlighted "many national aspirations and goals. The first aspiration is the day when all multinational forces will be able to leave Iraq. The second aspiration is convincing the court of world opinion that the people of Iraq are able to manage their affairs independently."

As the band played, Jabara, the provincial official accused of the looting, ran the Iraqi colors up the flagpole.

In Washington, the Bush administration trumpeted the handover. "The Iraqi forces are becoming more capable on a daily basis, and so this was, I think, an important example of that process moving forward," State Department spokesman Sean McCormack said that day. "It was, I think, symbolically important that this was a handover of one of Saddam's former palaces that he built in his home town, and now Iraqi forces that truly represent the will of the Iraqi people are now going to have control of that palace."

Some saw the U.S. emphasis on the Tikrit handover, also cited in speeches by President Bush and Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, as an assurance that U.S. and Iraqi troops were indeed moving toward the day when all of Iraq would be turned over to its own forces and officials.

Police first entered the palaces about 20 days after the Americans left, said Maj. Subhi Nadhum, a deputy commander of a police emergency unit in the area. "Iraqi forces were the only forces inside the presidential palaces after the Americans left," Nadhum said. "During those 20 days the deputy governor and members of the governing council were going back and forth" among the army commanders at the palaces.

Hiazza, the provincial police commander, said he started investigating immediately after police first entered the palaces. "I found everything was looted, even the electrical switches," he said.

When Hiazza formally accused Jabara and some members of the provincial council in connection with the alleged looting, authorities abruptly transferred Hiazza north to Baiji, an insurgent hotbed. "The reason they transferred me is definitely I will get killed there," Hiazza said. He resigned instead.

Thursday, January 12, 2006

103 Congress members visited Israel in 2005

In his summary to the Israeli Cabinet this week on relations with the United States, Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom said 23 U.S. senators and 80 members of the U.S. House of Representatives visited Israel last year, some multiple times.

“The legislative branch has maintained its unique and long-standing status as a stronghold of support for Israel, transcending party lines and Congressional houses,” he said

An Incendiary Threat in Iraq

Editorial
The New York Times
January 12, 2006

Iraq's most powerful Shiite politician has just dealt a huge blow to American-backed efforts to avoid civil war through the creation of a new, nationally inclusive constitutional order. That leader, Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, leader of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, has turned his back on the crucial pledge, made before last October's constitutional referendum, that the new charter would be open to substantial amendment by the newly elected Parliament. Instead, Mr. Hakim, who runs the dominant, Iranian-supported fundamentalist party, now says no broad changes should be made. In particular, he defends the current provisions allowing substantial autonomy for the oil-rich Shiite southeast.

The vote count from last month's parliamentary election is not yet complete. But it is already certain that the Shiite religious alliance, in which Mr. Hakim is the most important leader, will hold enough seats to block any constitutional changes it doesn't like. The only recourse is to persuade Mr. Hakim to respect that earlier pledge.

Mr. Hakim's latest position is a prescription for a national breakup and an endless civil war. It is also a provocative challenge to Washington, which helped broker the original promise of significant constitutional changes. On the basis of that promise, Sunni voters turned out in large numbers, both for the constitutional referendum and for last month's parliamentary vote. Drawing Sunni voters into democratic politics is vital to creating the stable, peaceful Iraq that President Bush has declared to be the precondition for an American military withdrawal. The most unacceptable defect of the new constitution for Sunnis is its provision for radically decentralizing national political and economic power, dispersing it to separate regions.

In a quirk of geology, most of Iraq's known oil deposits lie under provinces dominated by Shiites or Kurds, while the Sunni provinces of the west and north are resource-poor and landlocked. Iraq as a whole is rich enough to support all of its people relatively comfortably. But a radically decentralized Iraq would leave the Sunnis impoverished, aggrieved and desperate, driving them into the arms of radical Sunni groups in neighboring lands.

Although Sunnis are a minority in Iraq, they are an overwhelming majority in the Arab world. An irreconcilable split between Iraq's Shiites and Sunnis would leave the Shiites even more dependent than they are now on Iran and American troops.

Constitutional changes are needed in other areas as well, especially in regard to women's rights and the overly broad prohibitions against former members of Saddam Hussein's Baath Party. But decentralization is the most dangerously explosive issue right now. Mr. Hakim seems perversely determined to inflame it.

Is the Road Map's Moment Gone?

By Jim Hoagland
The Washington Post
Thursday, January 12, 2006; A21

The United States, its European and Arab allies, and the United Nations have labored for four months to turn Israel's unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip into a catalyst for the creation of an independent, viable Palestinian state. They are visibly failing.

Law and order have disappeared in the Gaza territory since the Israeli withdrawal. Kidnappings and gunfights, not campaign rallies, are the tools of electioneering there. Financial mismanagement by Mahmoud Abbas's Palestinian Authority has forced the World Bank to freeze $60 million in budget support and effectively move the PA toward bankruptcy in a matter of weeks.

The spiral toward chaos in Gaza and Ariel Sharon's sudden incapacitation by a severe stroke are destabilizing blows to President Bush's proclaimed strategy for transforming the Middle East into a zone of democracies. Bush must reassess whether he can get there from here.

With Sharon in power, the odds on the "road map" diplomatic process delivering the democratic Palestinian state that Bush and Sharon conditionally endorse were slim. Without Sharon in power, the odds drop to virtually zero.

The Gaza withdrawal was the product not of understandings between Sharon and Abbas but of an ambivalent if productive relationship between Sharon and Bush. Ending the occupation of Gaza was above all an Israeli-American arrangement, tied to the expectation that the Israeli prime minister's time in office would begin and end roughly with the American president's tenure.

The eight-year political balance sheet of give-and-take that the two leaders set up underpinned Sharon's formal acceptance of the U.N.-blessed process for creating a Palestinian state. The road map toward peace was a risk that the audacious Sharon was willing to take to secure Bush's backing, not an objective he sought or ever planned.

Just as Europeans abandoned colonialism to improve their own lives and not the lives of the Africans, Arabs and Asians they set free, Sharon ended Israel's occupation of Gaza solely for Israeli security reasons. He would wall in the Gazans with security fences and other measures and remain seemingly indifferent to what became of them.

But Sharon's daring gave Bush, the international community and, most of all, the Palestinians an opening that seemed to promise complete autonomy in Gaza and significant unilateral withdrawals from the West Bank if Sharon won reelection in March.

Sharon's incapacitation and the Gaza upheavals now call that opening into question. No other Israeli politician has the domestic support, the audacity and the force of personality to bulldoze forward historic change in the West Bank by the end of Bush's term. Moreover, the turmoil in Gaza is closing the window of international support for such change.

The road map, like most formulas for peacemaking, is based on the commendable premise that everyone deserves a second or even third chance. Right now the Palestinians are severely testing that article of faith -- at a moment when they have everything to gain from taking responsibility for their affairs and demonstrating political maturity.

Forcing Egyptian police officers and European Union observers to flee their posts for safety hardly suggests maturity. Neither does the decision by the Palestinian Authority to raise salaries and break its commitment to live within the large aid flows that international donors provide. That act triggered the freeze on budget support by the World Bank.

After Yasser Arafat died, "we hoped for new momentum in the direction of governmental reforms and the fight against corruption," World Bank representative Nigel Roberts told the Israeli daily Haaretz this week. But "Arafatism" lives on without Arafat and has grown worse, Roberts added.

Instead of moving to transform themselves into the nucleus of one of the Arab world's first true democracies -- as Bush, Sharon and their road-map partners pretended the Palestinians quickly could -- the Palestinian territories continue to be angry, explosive ghettos. In Gaza, gunmen who recently were receiving financial rewards for attacking Israelis are now "unemployed" and threaten their neighbors and the Palestinian Authority.

It must be said that four months is a short time to fix the consequences of centuries of occupation of the Palestinians by Turks, Arabs and Israelis, as well as the damage caused by the scandalous insistence of Arab states and the United Nations that the Palestinians remain enclosed in permanent refugee camps, even on their own lands.

Yes, that must be said. But so must this: The striking down of Ariel Sharon at a crucial moment of transformation demonstrates that in the Middle East today, a short time is the only time you've got.

Wednesday, January 11, 2006

Muslim Fulla Doll


Fulla dolls displayed at a Cairo toy store. The dark-eyed and olive-skinned Fulla has replaced her American rival's skimpy skirts with more modest "outdoor fashion" and Barbie's luxuriant blonde mane with an Islamic veil(AFP/Khaled Desouki)

Syria In Their Sights

The neocons plan their next “cakewalk.”By Robert Dreyfuss
The American Conservative
January 16, 2006 Issue

It’s happening again. It all sounds depressingly familiar, and it is. The Bush administration accuses the leader of a major Arab country of supporting terrorism and harboring weapons of mass destruction. The stable of neoconservative pundits begins beating the drums of war. American forces begin massing on the country’s border, amid ominous talk of cross-border attacks. Top U.S. officials warn that American patience with the country’s leader is running out, and the United States imposes economic sanctions unilaterally. There are threats about taking the whole thing to the United Nations Security Council. And, in Washington, an exile leader with questionable credentials begins making the rounds of official Washington and finds doors springing open at the Pentagon, the National Security Council, and at Elizabeth Cheney’s shop at the State Department.

This time it is Syria. The pressure is on, and it will likely get a lot worse very soon. On Dec. 15, the second installment of the report by a UN team investigating the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri is delivered. The first report, released in October, implicated several members of President Bashar Assad’s family in the Hariri murder, though without hard evidence. It would be wrong, however, to see the Bush administration’s campaign against Syria only through the lens of the Hariri case. Like the attack on Iraq, it is a longstanding vendetta.

Three years ago, the U.S. invasion of Iraq was widely viewed as the first chapter of a region-wide strategy to redraw the entire map of the Middle East. After Iraq, Syria and Iran would be the next targets, after which the oil-rich states of the Arabian Gulf, including Saudi Arabia, would follow. It was a policy driven by neoconservatives in and out of the Bush administration, and they didn’t exactly make an effort to keep it secret. In April 2003, in an article in The American Prospect entitled “Just the Beginning,” I wrote, “Those who think that U.S. armed forces can complete a tidy war in Iraq, without the battle spreading beyond Iraq’s borders, are likely to be mistaken.” The article quoted various neocon strategists who sought precisely that. Among them was Michael Ledeen, the arch-Machiavellian and Iran-Contra manipulator-in-chief, who argued from his perch at the American Enterprise Institute: “I think we’re going to be obliged to fight a regional war, whether we want to or not. As soon as we land in Iraq, we’re going to face the whole terrorist network. It may turn out to be a war to remake the world.”

Since then, of course, the conventional wisdom has evolved in a rather different direction. As the war in Iraq bogged down, and as a public outcry developed against the neoconservatives over the bungled war, the belief took hold that the United States had bitten off more than it could chew in Iraq—so that Syria, Iran, and the rest of President Bush’s evildoers can rest easy. According to this theory, the United States no longer has the stomach, or the capability, to spread the war beyond Iraq as originally intended. Our troops are stretched too thin, our allies are reining us in, and cooler heads are prevailing in Washington—or so the theory goes.

But the news from Syria shows that the conventional wisdom is wrong. The United States is indeed pursuing a hard-edged regime-change strategy for Syria. And it isn’t necessarily going to be a Cold War—in fact, it could well get very hot very soon. In Washington, analysts disagree over exactly how far the Bush administration is willing to go in pursuing its goal of overthrowing the Assad government. In the view of Flynt Leverett, a former CIA Syria analyst now at the Brookings Institution, the White House favors a kind of slow-motion toppling. In a forum at Brookings, Leverett, author of Inheriting Syria: Bashar’s Trial by Fire, announced his conclusion that Bush was pursuing “regime change on the cheap” in Syria. But others disagree, and believe that Syria could indeed be the next Iraq. For neoconservatives, ‘tis a consummation devoutly to be wished. For the rest of us—watching the war in Iraq unfold in horror, lurching toward breakup and civil war—the prospect ought to be both tragic and alarming.

Having ridded itself of one of its own inside neoconservatives, reporter Judith Miller—who once co-authored a book with the always apoplectic Laurie Mylroie, the originator of the novel idea that Saddam Hussein was behind the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing—the New York Times now warns correctly that any chance for positive change in Syria can only occur “if President Bush rejects the counsel of neoconservative advisers who have learned nothing from Iraq and now dream of overthrowing Mr. Assad with unilateral force.” So far, at least, there is no sign that the president has rejected them at all.

The fall of the Assad regime could open Syria, and the region, to widespread instability. “No one knows what is going to come out of it,” says Wayne White, the former deputy director of the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research on Middle East issues. “It’s making me nervous. What, exactly, is ‘Syria’? There are cleavages there. The place could just break up.” White says that no one knows the extent to which Sunni Islamic radicals have organized themselves in Syria, especially through the Muslim Brotherhood. “There could be a lot more Islamic militancy there than we’re aware of.”

For Assad, none of this is exactly a surprise. On March 1, 2003, as U.S. forces massed for the attack on Iraq, Assad addressed an emergency summit meeting of the Arab League. “We are all targeted,” he said. “We are all in danger.”

On Oct. 6, in his saber-rattling declaration of war against “Islamofascism,” President Bush not-so-subtly warned Syria that it might be next. “State sponsors [of terrorism] like Syria and Iran have a long history of collaboration with terrorists, and they deserve no patience from the victims of terror,” said Bush, speaking to the National Endowment for Democracy. “The United States makes no distinction between those who commit acts of terror and those who support and harbor them, because they’re equally as guilty of murder. Any government that chooses to be an ally of terror has also chosen to be an enemy of civilization. And the civilized world must hold those regimes to account.” Echoing Bush, U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad warned bluntly that “our patience is running out with Syria,” and like other U.S. officials Khalilzad blamed the Assad government for America’s troubles in Iraq.

Just before the president spoke, according to Knight Ridder, senior Bush administration officials met in a high-level powwow to discuss U.S. options for dealing with Syria. Among the alternatives reportedly discussed at the meeting was “limited military action,” and despite the fact that intelligence on Syria’s actual role in supporting the resistance in Iraq is hazy at best, the story, by reporter Warren Strobel, revealed that “one option under consideration was bombing several villages 30 to 40 miles inside Syria that some officials believe have been harboring Iraqi insurgents.” On Oct. 15, the New York Times reported that the Bush administration was threatening “hot pursuit” and other attacks into Syrian territory. It added, “A series of clashes in the last year between American and Syrian troops, including a prolonged firefight this summer that killed several Syrians, has raised the prospect that cross-border military operations may become a dangerous new front in the Iraq war, according to current and former military and government officials.”

Over the past several weeks, U.S. forces in Iraq have conducted massive air and ground attacks in cities along the Iraq-Syria border, in a sweeping offensive in advance of the Dec. 15 election in Iraq. In Syria—whose military is already in turmoil over its hurried evacuation from Lebanon and whose government is rattled to the core because of charges that top Syrian officials may have been involved in the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Hariri—the prospect of a second front along its eastern border is raising alarm. Although intelligence analysts assert that Syria could weather a series of limited strikes along its border without undue consequences for the regime, in fact such attacks could have unforeseen results, even if they don’t presage a wider war by the United States. Still, in his Washington Post online column “Early Warning,” William M. Arkin wrote on Nov. 8 that the U.S. Central Command has been “directed by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to prepare a ‘strategic concept’ for Syria, the first step in the creation of a full-fledged war plan.”

The wider war that the Bush administration seems to be pursuing was telegraphed long ago by the various neocon pundits and prognosticators. Charles Krauthammer used his Washington Post column in March to suggest that the way to advance the “glorious, delicate, revolutionary moment in the Middle East” is to go after Syria. “This is no time to listen to the voices of tremulousness, indecision, compromise, and fear,” he wrote. Instead, the Bush administration’s commitment to spreading democracy should take it “through Beirut to Damascus.” William Kristol, editor of The Weekly Standard and co-author of The War in Iraq (“The mission begins in Baghdad, but it does not end there”), helpfully suggested some options that the Bush administration is clearly thinking about now. In The Weekly Standard last year, Kristol wrote, “We could bomb Syrian military facilities; we could go across the border in force to stop infiltration; we could occupy the town of Abu Kamal in eastern Syria, a few miles from the border, which seems to be the planning and organizing center for Syrian activities in Iraq; we could covertly help or overtly support the Syrian opposition. ... It’s time to get serious about dealing with Syria as part of winning in Iraq, and in the broader Middle East.”

All that is consistent with the neocons’ long-held view about Syria and the region. For years they’ve been calling for regime change in Syria, which was a major target in the now infamous paper written a decade ago by Richard Perle, Douglas Feith, David Wurmser, and others entitled “A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm,” prepared as a study-group project for Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. In it, the authors called for “striking Syrian military targets in Lebanon, and should that prove insufficient, striking at select targets in Syria proper” as a “prelude to a redrawing of the map of the Middle East which would threaten Syria’s territorial integrity.” Wurmser, a former AEI Middle East specialist, played a key role in the Pentagon’s Office of Special Plans, which helped Vice President Cheney and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld manufacture false intelligence to justify the war in Iraq. Wurmser is currently an aide on Vice President Cheney’s national-security staff.

In 1997, the same circle—Perle, Feith, Ledeen, Wurmser, et al.—created the U.S. Committee for a Free Lebanon. The USCFL—like the Committee for the Liberation of Iraq, which involved the same cast of characters—lobbied hard for the so-called Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Act (SALSA), which was passed by Congress and signed into law in 2003. It was SALSA that set into motion the Bush administration’s current squeeze on Syria, beginning with limited U.S. economic sanctions on Damascus triggered by the act. One of the chief problems with SALSA, which was opposed by just about all of the foreign-policy professionals in the State Department and among Middle East experts, is that it created a slow-motion confrontation with Syria precisely at the moment when the United States most needed Syrian co-operation both in the war against Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda and in helping to stabilize Iraq. “In Iraq, the two countries we most need the help of are Syria and Iran,” says Chas W. Freeman. “We’re not trying to involve them. We’re trying to up the ante by confronting Syria and Iran.”

Wesley Clark, a retired Army general who served as supreme allied commander in Europe, wants to see the United States engage Syria in a diplomatic dialogue. “The very last thing we need to do is to engage in hot-pursuit raids into Syria,” he says.

The fact is, after 2001, Syria worked closely with the United States in tracking down al-Qaeda cells and, according to former U.S. intelligence officials, Syrian intelligence was very helpful. (Perhaps even too helpful, since the United States apparently “rendered” suspects captured in the war on terrorism to Damascus for less-than-civil interrogation by Syrian authorities.) “In the aftermath of 9/11, Syria provided the United States with actionable intelligence on al Qaeda affiliates, as administration officials publicly acknowledge,” wrote Flynt Leverett, the former CIA Syria expert. “While I was serving on the National Security Council, this information let U.S. and allied authorities thwart planned operations that, had they been carried out, would have resulted in the deaths of Americans.”

Even after the war in Iraq, while some U.S. officials threatened Syria for its alleged, but unproven, support for Iraqi resistance groups, other U.S. officials worked to establish better relations between Washington and Damascus. It isn’t hard to guess which was which: the Bush administration’s neocons wanted a showdown with Syria, while the realists at the CIA and the State Department sought a settlement. The prospects of a U.S.-Syria deal reached their high-water mark in September 2004. During that period, top U.S. officials, including William Burns of the State Department, visited Syria to talk about getting Syria’s help in shutting down the Syria-Iraq border, establishing joint U.S.-Syrian border patrols, and providing Syria with high-tech surveillance gear to help stop the infiltration of Islamist radicals into Iraq. There were rumors everywhere, too, about Syrian-Israeli peace talks over the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. And Secretary of State Colin Powell, visiting the region, went so far as to praise what he saw as “positive” news from Syria. “I sense,” he said, “a new attitude from the Syrians.” So obvious was the effort that Time magazine published a story entitled “Cozying Up to Syria,” an idea that seems quaint now.

That all came to a crashing end a few days later after an assassination that stunned the world—no, not Hariri’s, but the murder of Izzedine Sheik Khalil, a top official of Hamas, apparently by Israel’s Mossad, in a huge car bomb in Damascus. It was the latest in a string of Israeli provocations against Syria, including the killing of a Hamas leader in Beirut, an Israeli air force strike at a Palestinian training camp outside Damascus, and Israeli overflights that buzzed the Assad family’s home in Latakia. Not without reason, Syria’s Foreign Minister Farouq Sharaa charged that the Israeli assassination was meant specifically to disrupt the progress in U.S.-Syrian relations. And so it did.

Not coincidentally, the end of the thaw in relations between Washington and Damascus occurred as the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1559, aimed at putting pressure on Syria to end its presence in Lebanon. Along with SALSA, Resolution 1559—which followed a stupid and clumsy attempt by Assad to extend the presidency of the pro-Syrian President Emile Lahoud of Lebanon—set into motion the train of events that led to Hariri’s assassination on Valentine’s Day 2005. By October 2004, a full-blown crisis between the United States and Syria was underway. Even the Washington Post began calling for war. “Syria’s government has been a longtime sponsor of terrorism, a stockpiler of missiles and chemical weapons, and an unapologetic ally of Islamic extremists; it has allowed hundreds, if not thousands, of insurgents to stream across its borders to fight U.S. forces in Iraq,” thundered the Post, though utterly wrong about nearly every one of its charges. Concluded the Post, the United States could no longer tolerate Syria and had to consider “breaking off of relations [and] military retaliation.”

Since then, the United States has moved closer and closer to war with Syria. In this history-as-farce rerun of the war with Iraq, there is even a Syrian Ahmad Chalabi, namely Farid al-Ghadry, the founder of the exile Reform Party of Syria, which is mixing it up with a varying cast of characters among Syrian exiles and reformers, from those with democratic ideals all the way to Syria’s Muslim Brotherhood. Earlier this year, Ghadry and a cohort of allies won an audience with a gaggle of top U.S. officials from the State Department, the National Security Council, and the Defense Department.

Virtually no one believes that Ghadry, a U.S. businessman, has any future in Syria. But the astonishing thing about the Bush administration’s destabilization of the Syrian regime is that no one in Washington has any idea who or what might emerge to replace Assad’s government. Asked to guess, most intelligence analysts throw up their hands. Some argue that the most likely heir to a post-Assad Syria would be the Muslim Brotherhood, an underground secret society that has long been at war with the regime in Syria, ever since President Hafez Assad inaugurated a new constitution in the early 1970s that proclaimed Syria to be a secular, socialist republic. But Syria, a nation of just 18 million people, has as many as two million Christians, two million Kurds, and many other non-Sunni minorities—including the ruling Alawite group, to which the family of the president and his chief backers belong. As a result, Syria would not be ruled easily by Muslim Brotherhood-style Islamists.

Meanwhile, the UN investigation into Hariri’s murder is a ticking time bomb for Assad. Already beset by the conflict with Israel, the war in Iraq, and a crisis in Lebanon, Bashar Assad will have to summon all the wiliness of his late father to survive the next few months. In an interview with CNN’s Christiane Amanpour—who, in parroting the White House line, seemed to be auditioning to reprise the role of Judy Miller in this Middle East war—Assad plaintively pointed out that there is little that Syria can do to stop insurgents from crossing the long desert border between Syria and Iraq, and he added that the United States had failed to control the Iraqi side. “There is nobody on the Iraqi side, neither Americans nor Iraqis,” said Assad. (Amanpour was unmoved. “Why cannot your forces go house to house? Why cannot you actively stop this, close it down?”) “We are interested in a more stable Iraq,” insisted Assad. “[The United States] only talks about a stable Iraq, but the mistakes they make there every day give the opposite result.”

Imad Moustapha, Syria’s ambassador to the United States, told the Boston Globe in November that the United States recently refused yet another proposal from Syria to revive co-operation with Damascus on intelligence. “What we see in general is an administration that is categorically refusing to engage with Syria on any level,” said Moustapha. “We see an administration that would really love to see another crisis in the Middle East, this time targeting Syria. ... Even before the Iraq war started, they had this grand vision for the Middle East.”

Less grand is the vision of Bill O’Reilly, the Fox News host, who ripped a page from Pat Robertson’s assassination handbook. “It’s Bashar’s life,” said O’Reilly on Oct. 5. “I mean, we could take his life, and we should take his life if he doesn’t help us out.”

Robert Dreyfuss is the author of Devil’s Game: How the United States Helped Unleash Fundamentalist Islam. He covers national security for Rolling Stone and writes frequently for The American Prospect, The Nation, and Mother Jones.