Friday, October 20, 2006

Plan B

By Eliot A. Cohen
Wall Street Journal
October 20, 2006

That the Iraq war is, if not a failure, failing, requires little demonstration. By all measures -- but above all, the sheer insecurity of daily life in Baghdad -- things have been getting worse, not better. Yes, there are islands of security and stability, particularly in the Kurdish north; but the communal violence between Sunni and Shia has gotten worse. The Iraqi army has improved, but the police, consigned to secondary relevance by the U.S., are penetrated by militias. Iranian influence spreads, and Iranian-designed and -manufactured improvised explosive devices inflict higher tolls on American troops. With an eye to the forthcoming American elections, the enemy is ratcheting up the violence, and successfully.

It will be important in future years to settle whether the Iraq war was the right idea badly executed, an enterprise doomed to disappoint, or simply folly. There will be individuals to be held accountable (not all of whom have been in the crosshairs of journalists and partisans), and institutions whose shortcomings require not only soul-searching but reform. That's for later. The question now is, what should we do?

The current course -- Plan A -- involves an open-ended commitment of some 130,000 or 140,000 soldiers, with temporary surges during periods of crisis. Its theory of victory seems to be that American support, nagging and cajoling can eventually bring the Iraqi security forces to maturity and gradually hand over responsibility to a democratically constituted, unitary Iraqi government. It is difficult to believe that the U.S. Army and Marine Corps -- filled with soldiers now doing their second or third tour in Iraq, including soldiers whose participation is enforced by "stop-loss" orders that keep them beyond their enlistments -- can sustain this indefinitely. The hairline cracks in the armed forces are there, and growing for those willing to see them. Public support for the war is dwindling, and most importantly, we are not only making no progress: Things are actively getting worse. So what are the alternatives?

Getting by with help from your enemies. It is bruited about in Washington that the Iraq Study Group, a collection of worthies commissioned by Congress that has spent several days in Iraq, chiefly in the Green Zone, will recommend turning to Iran and Syria to, in effect, bail out the U.S. To think that either state, with remarkable records of violence, duplicity and hostility to the U.S., will rescue us bespeaks a certain willful blindness. And to think that the Sunni states of the Arab world, much less Iraq's Sunni population, would welcome such a deal is more incredible yet. Syria is, as the Lebanon war and its earlier defense treaty with Iran demonstrated, now a client state of Iran. This option would in effect mean conceding dominance in the northern Gulf to that country; it would pave the way for more wars, and in no way guarantee us a clean exit.

Wash your hands. Simple withdrawal, with or without a timetable and surely under fire -- although American forces could probably cope with that -- would have the disadvantages of the first option, without the putative benefits. Iraq would almost surely become even more violent, with massacres of scores or even hundreds being replaced by massacres of thousands, and various regional powers straining to secure their own buffers and clients.

Double your bets. Conversely, the U.S. could react by reasserting its strength in Iraq -- sending an additional 30,000 or 40,000 troops to secure Baghdad and its environs, and making a far more strenuous effort than it has thus far to take control of the civilian ministries that are now merely fronts for political parties and their militias. But could American public opinion sustain this? More importantly, where would the soldiers come from? And has the strain on Iraqis' sense of national identity become so great that those institutions could be built?

Hunker down and let the fires burn. The U.S. military, at its current strength or something less, could, conceivably, simply retreat to its forward operating bases, do its best to train a neutral and effective military and police force, and allow communal violence to take its course. Over time, new demographic realities would emerge, as Sunnis and Shiites separate into different neighborhoods, while some minorities -- Christians, most notably -- simply flee the country. But would there be anything left once the massacres had stopped? And would they stop?

Back to counterinsurgency. One school has it that the U.S. should never have engaged directly in combat with Iraqi insurgents. Instead, it should have focused overwhelmingly on the training mission, retaining only enough combat units to rescue Iraqi forces (and their U.S. advisers) if they get in over their heads. To some extent this is already going on; but some have suggested much more radical reductions in the U.S. presence, down to 40,000 or 50,000 soldiers. The question is whether the levels of violence are so high, and the competence of the Iraqi forces so limited, that this has a chance of success. And what would be Plan C if it were to fail?

Let the generals have it. The Iraqi government is incompetent. Its ministries are viewed not as national institutions but as the playthings of competing parties and their bands of thugs. Yet Iraqi nationalism is real, and it is found where nationalism often is -- in the armed forces. A junta of military modernizers might be the only hope of a country whose democratic culture is weak, whose politicians are either corrupt or incapable. But what would then become of the American goal of democratization? And could the generals suppress the militias that have backing from abroad, and support in local communities?

Break it up. This option would have us concede the end of Iraq as a nation state. The precedents in the Middle East -- with the exceptions of Egypt and Iran, a collection of artificial entities produced by the highly fallible imaginations of British and French diplomats at the end of World War I -- are chilling. Presumably, population transfers on a large scale would be needed, although the problem of multiconfessional Baghdad would be particularly difficult. But it is hard to imagine that a formally independent Kurdistan would last long in the face of the hostility of all of its neighbors, or that the oil-deprived and landlocked Sunni state of western Iraq would be tranquil, or that the southern Shiastan would be able to resist Iranian penetration.

All of the options for Plan B are either wretched to contemplate or based on fantasy; the most plausible (the sixth option, a coup which we quietly endorse) would involve a substantial repast of crow that this administration will be deeply unwilling to eat. But it is not only the administration that can, and should, feel uncomfortable about the choices that lie ahead.

An honest debate about Iraq policy will require of all who participate in it to acknowledge some unpleasant facts. We must all admit, for example, that the enemy (or rather, enemies, of us and of one another) exercises a vote. We have not yet had a Tet offensive, but the experience of Hezbollah in the Lebanon war may well encourage the Shiite militias, particularly those influenced by Iran, to try something like it. Iran's influence is great, and will become greater. There will be considerable bloodshed ahead, but our choices, though they may not make it better, could make it a lot worse.

American prestige has taken a hard knock; it will probably take a harder knock, and in ways that will not be restored without a considerable and successful use of American military power down the road. The tides of Sunni salafism and Iran's distinct combination of messianism and power politics have not crested, and will not crest without much greater violence in which we too will be engaged. Whether it be the Islamization of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the subversion of conservative regimes by salafist movements, or the continuing radicalization of European Muslims, the Long War, as the administration calls it, will be even longer, and more difficult, than anyone might have thought.

It is folly to think we can win in Iraq the way some of us thought possible in 2003. It would be even greater folly to think that by getting out, learning our lessons, and licking our wounds we can save ourselves from considerable danger, expense, effort and loss in what remains a protracted and global conflict with mortal enemies.

Mr. Cohen is Robert E. Osgood professor of strategic studies at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies.

Kremlin Puts Foreign NGO’s on Notice

By C. J. CHIVERS
The New York Times
October 20, 2006

MOSCOW, Oct. 19 — Scores of foreign private organizations were forced to cease their operations in Russia on Thursday while the government considered whether to register them under a new law that has received sharp international criticism.

Among the suspended organizations are some of those most critical of the Kremlin, including Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, and others, like the National Democratic Institute and the International Republican Institute, that have been accused by Russian officials of instigating or assisting revolutions against other former Soviet republics.

The Justice Ministry, which is responsible for registering foreign private organizations, insisted that the suspensions were neither retaliatory nor permanent.

It issued a statement saying the suspended organizations had not properly filed new registration materials or had submitted the required materials on the last day before the registration deadline, which was midnight Wednesday. It said it was rushing to review the applications it had received.

“It is important to note that lack of reregistration does not entail the liquidation of the organization,” the statement said. “The talk here is only that these organizations cannot carry out the activity envisaged by their charters before they are brought into the register.”

The number of suspended organizations is not entirely clear. The statement said the ministry had received applications from 185 organizations, approved 108 of them and continued to review the 77 others.

But the suspensions were the latest chapter in Russia’s pressure on foreign organizations that have offices on its soil. They occurred in a climate of deepening worry about the Kremlin’s crackdown on civil society and just days before a planned visit by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice.

Ms. Rice has expressed concern about the law regulating foreign private organizations, known as nongovernmental organizations, or NGO’s, which was passed earlier this year.

Some Russian officials, including Nikolai P. Patrushev, the chief of the domestic intelligence service, have accused the groups of interfering with state affairs or even harboring spies.

The new law, strongly backed by President Vladimir V. Putin, created extensive new filing requirements, which in some cases the organizations said had been so tedious and lengthy as to be almost impossible to fulfill. The groups have also expressed apprehension over the rules’ vagueness, which could allow any group to be audited, and perhaps closed, on a pretext.

They and their supporters have said that how the law is enforced will be a test of whether Russia will allow foreign organizations that it dislikes to continue to work in the country. The first deadline, and its effects on Thursday, were accompanied by a strong sense of concern, even fear.

“My fear is that their intention is to shut us down,” Josh Rubenstein, a director at Amnesty International, said by telephone. Amnesty International has had an office in Russia since the days of the last Soviet leader, Mikhail S. Gorbachev, he said.

The Justice Ministry posted a list of 73 organizations that were not yet approved, and thus were suspended. At least 38 of those were listed by the ministry as American or had a clear American affiliation, including the American Bar Association, the American-Russian Business Council, the American Trade Chamber and Johns Hopkins University.

The suspended Western organizations also included the Danish Refugee Council and the French and Belgian offices of Doctors Without Borders.

Other news organizations reported that nearly 100 groups had been suspended, but did not provide a list. The Associated Press quoted one Justice Ministry official as saying that 96 groups had been suspended, while the Itar-Tass news agency later quoted the same official as saying the number was 93.

While the ministry said it had approved 108 organizations for registration, it provided a list of only 80.

Forty-one of those were American, including the Ford Foundation, the Nuclear Threat Initiative and the Moscow office of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Of the 41, 33 appeared to be child adoption agencies.

As the day passed with offices idled, some of the affected groups declined to comment, saying they worried about antagonizing Russia while their registration documents were under review.

Others described a new posture their offices had assumed on Thursday: they abruptly stopped their work and programs but left their lights on and offices staffed.

Carroll Bogert, an associate director at Human Rights Watch, said by telephone from New York that its employees in Russia were still being paid, “but otherwise we are not operating in Russia.” She said she expected that the office would be registered once its documents were reviewed, and that the organization did not feel that it was a specific target.

The cessation of some organizations’ activities was denounced by their partners in the country.

Elena Panfilova, director of the Russian chapter of Transparency International, an anticorruption organization, said her office was registered as a domestic, not foreign, organization and so was not directly affected by the new procedures.

But she said she had work planned with other groups, which now were unable to meet with her. “It is appalling,” she said. “It is a total disgrace.”

The Justice Ministry said it was working to expedite the registrations and blamed the organizations for not providing required documentation.

Wednesday, October 18, 2006

The Hamas Network

The case for boycotting terrorist media.
BY MARK DUBOWITZ AND JONATHAN SNOW
Wall Street Journal
Wednesday, October 18, 2006

With its Al Manar television station launched in 1991, the Lebanese terrorist group Hezbollah has pioneered the use of mass media as a weapon. It uses the broadcaster to recruit suicide bombers, raise money for terrorist operations, conduct pre-attack surveillance and incite violence. This fall, the Palestinian terrorist group Hamas is poised to follow in Hezbollah's footsteps.

Until now, Hamas's Al Aqsa television has been broadcast only within the Gaza Strip. But this month it will begin satellite distribution via the Nilesat satellite, the Palestinian News Agency (Ramattan) reported in August. This would allow Hamas to spread its message of hatred across the Middle East, North Africa and most of Europe. Nilesat, owned by the Egyptian government, and Arabsat, majority-owned by the Saudi government, are the only two satellites still carrying Al Manar despite joint U.S.-European efforts to halt its broadcasts.

For a preview of things to come, it's worth looking into the Palestinian terror group's media operations at home. Like Hezbollah, Hamas uses its propaganda network to support terror activities, including recruiting suicide bombers, inculcating hatred, raising funds and providing direct operational support to terrorist operations.

Al Aqsa TV routinely broadcasts Hamas leaders calling for jihad, songs of incitement to murder, and videos of Hamas gunmen. Just like Hamas newspapers, magazines, and websites, Al Aqsa programs typically feature splashy stories glorifying the actions of "martyrs" and assurances that through their sacrifices the "Zionist Entity" will be destroyed.

Children are specifically targeted. Hamas produces radio and television shows and publishes an online magazine geared at preteens. A recent issue of the magazine opens with a cartoon of a smiling child riding a rocket while the previous issue glorified suicide bombers and other "martyrs" in cartoons and poetry.

Hamas websites have been used to raise money for terrorist activities, both explicitly and under the guise of "humanitarian" aid. There have been reports, citing Israeli intelligence, that Hamas field coordinators have used Voice of Al Aqsa radio broadcasts to provide terrorists with exact coordinates and trajectories to fire Qassam rockets at Israeli targets.

In short, there is no reason why the West should show more leniency toward Al Aqsa than toward Al Manar. While a few free speech activists have defended Hezbollah's television as a legitimate programmer, American and European governments have correctly identified it as a danger to free society. Washington designated Al Manar a terrorist organization, making it the first media outlet to be sanctioned under U.S. anti-terrorism laws. The European Union ruled that Al Manar contravened its broadcast laws and requested that European satellite providers stop carrying their programs. Private sector companies have taken action as well. Eight out of ten satellite providers have removed Al Manar from distribution and numerous multinational corporations have pulled more than $2 million in annual advertising from the station.
Similar steps can be taken to curb Hamas. The U.S. government should designate Al Aqsa TV as a terrorist organization. This would put strict limits on U.S. companies and banks from doing business with Al Aqsa. Multinational companies should refuse to advertise on Al Aqsa, denying it revenues that will ultimately go to support terrorist operations.

Finally, U.S. and European officials must put more pressure on the Egyptian government to deny Al Aqsa, as well as Al Manar, distribution over the Nilesat satellite. Egyptian officials cannot be interested in helping Hezbollah and Hamas radicalize their own citizens or the Arabic-speaking citizens of their European allies.

Given Al Manar's experience in the U.S. and Europe, Hamas may try to soften Al Aqsa's content to give it the veneer of a legitimate TV channel. However, policy makers and private sector executives must recognize a simple truth: Hamas is dedicated to the destruction of innocent civilians and until that changes, its television broadcasts will be used to further that goal.

A decade passed before the international community recognized the dangers posed by Hezbollah's Al Manar. Similar mistakes must not be made with Al Aqsa. Otherwise, in too many European and Middle Eastern homes, Hamas's hate TV could become the must-see fall programming for a new generation of terrorists.

Mr. Dubowitz leads the Coalition Against Terrorist Media, a project of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). Mr. Snow, who is writing a book on Hamas media, is manager of research for FDD.

Google And IBM Open New Development Centers In Israel

Ryan R. Jones
All Headline News Middle East Correspondent
October 18, 2006

Jerusalem, Israel (AHN) - Both Google and IBM on Tuesday announced that they were expanding their research and development operations in Israel.

Google plans to open a new R&D center in Tel Aviv, to compliment the one it already has in the northern port city of Haifa.

The Tel Aviv center will be headed by a noted Israeli expert in algorithms, data bases and Internet technology.

IBM added to its two existing R&D labs in Israel by opening a software lab dedicated to advancing the computer-maker giant's search, metadata management, and collaborative real-time technologies.

Over the past several years, IBM has also acquired several software companies with Israel-based development teams.

In remarks carried by Israeli21c, Meir Nissensohn, General Manager of IBM Israel, said the company's latest move "is a strong vote of confidence from IBM for the software development capabilities existing in this country."

Other computer-related companies that maintain major R&D centers in Israel include Intel and Microsoft.

Tuesday, October 17, 2006

Israel to support Nato patrols

Israel will provide support for Nato patrols in the Mediterranean under a co-operation pact agreed with the alliance.
by Reuters
Monday 16 October 2006

Nato has sought to bolster its presence in the Middle East, and the accord is the first one to be finalised since the 26-member alliance offered in 2004 to forge closer ties with Israel and six Arab states, it said on Monday.

"Israel is the first one to have agreed to the details of what co-operation should entail," said a Nato official, adding that details of the pact would be released later.

The details agreed on Monday included a pledge to provide support for counter-terrorism patrols by alliance ships.

Nato has offered Israel, Algeria, Egypt, Mauritania, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia help in reforming their armies and making it easier for them to cooperate with the military of alliance nations.

Arab interest

Algeria and Morocco have also expressed an interest in supporting the patrols, but the Arab response to offers of co-operation has been muted.

Many in the Arab world regard Nato as a US-dominated body that intends on interfering in Middle Eastern affairs.

Nato nonetheless held its first meeting in an Arab country this year with the seven Mediterranean partners in Morocco, and is looking to provide training for the countries, which include four Gulf states.

Diplomats say Jordan had shown interest in hosting a Nato-run academy but no final decision has yet been taken.

Monday, October 16, 2006

Arabs to the Rescue?

A chance to broaden the response in Darfur
The Washington Post
Monday, October 16, 2006; A20

FOR THE past three years, the United States and Europe have sent millions of dollars in aid to the Sudanese territory of Darfur. African countries, for their part, have come forward with some 7,000 peacekeepers. Americans, Europeans and Africans have all tried to bring about a political settlement between Sudan's government and Darfur's rebels. These various efforts have combined to slow the killing, though they have failed to halt it. But the Western and African efforts stand in stark contrast to the performance of Sudan's Arab neighbors, which have so far done next to nothing.

Recently the Arab League asserted that this might change. Its members offered to dispatch a force of Arab and Muslim troops as peacekeepers to Darfur, replacing or preferably reinforcing the underpowered African contingent whose mandate is set to expire soon. Under the terms of a Security Council resolution passed in August, the African force is supposed to be replaced by a 20,000-strong United Nations one. But Sudan's government has described a U.N. deployment as a "prelude to an invasion" of an Islamic country. However infuriating this claim, the fact is that the United Nations is not going to fight its way into Darfur. Depending on the details of its design, an Arab force could be an acceptable alternative.

The details matter because an Arab deployment would face credibility problems: It would be identified with Sudan's Arab-led government, which has equipped and supported Darfur's genocidal militia. Moreover, the ineffectiveness of the African Union force proves that peacekeeping in Darfur is no easy task: The Arabs would need to arrive with more troops and better equipment. But if Arab governments did deploy a robust force, they might succeed in quelling militia violence. That would solve the credibility problem.

It's hard to see how Sudan's government could resist an Arab and Muslim peacekeeping force by calling it a threat to Islam. Arab leaders have a good chance of deploying their proposed force if they press for it seriously. So the important question will be: Are the Arabs in fact serious?