Friday, October 03, 2008

U.S. to Fund Pro-American Publicity in Iraqi Media

By Karen DeYoung and Walter Pincus
Washington Post Staff Writers
Friday, October 3, 2008; A01

The Defense Department will pay private U.S. contractors in Iraq up to $300 million over the next three years to produce news stories, entertainment programs and public service advertisements for the Iraqi media in an effort to "engage and inspire" the local population to support U.S. objectives and the Iraqi government.

The new contracts -- awarded last week to four companies -- will expand and consolidate what the U.S. military calls "information/psychological operations" in Iraq far into the future, even as violence appears to be abating and U.S. troops have begun drawing down.

The military's role in the war of ideas has been fundamentally transformed in recent years, the result of both the Pentagon's outsized resources and a counterinsurgency doctrine in which information control is considered key to success. Uniformed communications specialists and contractors are now an integral part of U.S. military operations from Eastern Europe to Afghanistan and beyond.

Iraq, where hundreds of millions of dollars have been spent on such contracts, has been the proving ground for the transformation. "The tools they're using, the means, the robustness of this activity has just skyrocketed since 2003. In the past, a lot of this stuff was just some guy's dreams," said a senior U.S. military official, one of several who discussed the sensitive defense program on the condition of anonymity.

The Pentagon still sometimes feels it is playing catch-up in a propaganda market dominated by al-Qaeda, whose media operations include sophisticated Web sites and professionally produced videos and audios featuring Osama bin Laden and his lieutenants. "We're being out-communicated by a guy in a cave," Secretary Robert M. Gates often remarks.

But Defense Department officials think their own products have become increasingly imaginative and competitive. Military and contractor-produced media campaigns, spotlighting killings by insurgents, "helped in developing attitudes" that led Iraqis to reject al-Qaeda in Iraq over the past two years, an official said. Now that the insurgency is in disarray, he said, the same tools "could potentially be helpful" in diminishing the influence of neighboring Iran.

U.S.-produced public service broadcasts and billboards have touted improvements in government services, promoted political reconciliation, praised the Iraqi military and encouraged Iraqi citizens to report criminal activity. When national euphoria broke out last year after an Iraqi singer won a talent contest in Lebanon, the U.S. military considered producing an Iraqi version of "American Idol" to help build nonsectarian nationalism. The idea was shelved as too expensive, an official said, but "we're trying to think out of the box on" reconciliation.

One official described how part of the program works: "There's a video piece produced by a contractor . . . showing a family being attacked by a group of bad guys, and their daughter being taken off. The message is: You've got to stand up against the enemy." The professionally produced vignette, he said, "is offered for airing on various [television] stations in Iraq. . . . They don't know that the originator of the content is the U.S. government. If they did, they would never run anything."

"If you asked most Iraqis," he said, "they would say, 'It came from the government, our own government.' "

The Pentagon's solicitation for bids on the contracts noted that media items produced "may or may not be non-attributable to coalition forces." "If they thought we were doing it, it would not be as effective," another official said of the Iraqis. "In the Middle East, they are so afraid they're going to be Westernized . . . that you have to be careful when you're trying to provide information to the population."

The Army's counterinsurgency manual, which Gen. David H. Petraeus co-wrote in 2006, describes information operations in detail, citing them among the "critical" military activities "that do not involve killing insurgents." Petraeus, who became the top U.S. commander in Iraq early last year, led a "surge" in combat troops and information warfare.

Some of the new doctrine emerged from Petraeus's own early experience in Iraq. As commander of the 101st Airborne Division in northern Nineveh province in 2003, he ensured that war-ravaged radio and television stations were brought rapidly back on line. At his urging, the first TV programs included "Nineveh Talent Search" and a radio call-in show hosted by his Arabic interpreter, Sadi Othman, a Palestinian American.

Othman, a former New York cabdriver employed by Reston-based SOS International, remained at Petraeus's side during the general's subsequent Iraq deployments; the company refers to him as a senior adviser to Petraeus.

SOSi has been one of the most prominent communications contractors working in Iraq, winning a two-year $200 million contract in 2006 to "assist in gathering information, conducting analysis and providing timely solutions and advice regarding cultural, religious, political, economic and public perceptions."

"We definitely believe this is a growth area in the DOD," said Julian Setian, SOSi's chief operating officer. "We are seeing more and more requests for professional assistance in media-related strategic communications efforts, specifically in gauging of perceptions in foreign media with regard to U.S. operations."

The four companies that will share in the new contract are SOSi, the Washington-based Lincoln Group, Alexandria-based MPRI and Leonie Industries, a Los Angeles contractor. All specialize in strategic communications and have done previous defense work.

Defense officials maintained that strict rules are enforced against disseminating false information. "Our enemies have the luxury of not having to tell the truth," Undersecretary of Defense Eric Edelman told a congressional hearing last month. "We pay an extremely high price if we ever even make a slight error in putting out the facts."

Contractors require security clearances, and proof that their teams possess sufficient linguistic abilities and knowledge of Iraqi culture. The Iraqi government has little input on U.S. operations, although U.S. officials say they have encouraged Iraqis to be more aggressive in molding public support.

The Pentagon is sensitive to criticism that it has sometimes blurred the lines between public-affairs activities and unattributed propaganda. As information operations in Iraq expanded, some senior officers warned that they risked a return to psychological and deception operations discredited during the Vietnam War.

In 2006, the Pentagon's inspector general found that media work that the Lincoln Group did in Iraq was improperly supervised but legal. The contractor had prepared news items considered favorable to the U.S. military and paid to place them in the Iraqi media without attribution. Then-Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld told reporters that his initial reaction to the anonymous pay-to-publish program was "Gee, that's not what we ought to be doing."

On Aug. 21, the day before bids on the new contract were closed, the solicitation was reissued to replace repeated references to information and psychological operations with the term "media services."

Senior military officials said that current media placement is done through Iraqi middlemen and that broadcast time is usually paid. But they said they knew of no recent instance of payment to place unattributed newspaper articles. The officials maintained that news items are now a minor part of the operation, which they said is focused on public service promotions and media monitoring.

But a lengthy list of "deliverables" under the new contract proposal includes "print columns, press statements, press releases, response-to-query, speeches and . . . opinion editorials"; radio broadcasts "in excess of 300 news stories" monthly and 150 each on sports and economic themes; and 30- and 60-minute broadcast documentary and entertainment series.

Contractors will also develop and maintain Web sites; assess news articles in the Iraqi, U.S. and international media; and determine ways to counter coverage deemed negative, according to the contract solicitation the government posted in May. Polls and focus groups will be used to monitor Iraqi attitudes under a separate three-year contract totaling up to $45 million.

While U.S. law prohibits the use of government money to direct propaganda at U.S. audiences, the "statement of work" included in the proposal, written by the U.S. Joint Contracting Command in Iraq, notes the need to "communicate effectively with our strategic audiences (i.e. Iraqi, pan-Arabic, International, and U.S. audiences) to gain widespread acceptance of [U.S. and Iraqi government] core themes and messages."

Lawmakers have often challenged the propriety of the military's information operations, even when they take place outside the United States. The Pentagon itself has frequently lamented the need to undertake duties beyond combat and peacekeeping, and Gates has publicly questioned the "creeping militarization" of tasks civilians traditionally perform.

In 2006, President Bush put the State Department in charge of the administration's worldwide "strategic communications," but the size of the military's efforts dwarf those of the diplomats. State estimates it will spend $5.6 million on public diplomacy in Iraq in fiscal 2008. A provision in the fiscal 2009 Defense Authorization Bill has called for a "close examination" of the State and defense communications programs "to better formulate a comprehensive strategy."

Some inside the military itself have questioned the effectiveness of the defense program. "I'm not a huge fan" of information operations, one military official said, adding that Iraqi opinions -- as for most people -- are formed more by what they experience than by what they read in a newspaper, hear on the radio or see on billboards.

"A lot of money is being thrown around," he said, "and I'm not sure it's all paying off as much as we think it is."

Monday, September 29, 2008

defeating the campaign by some members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference

HRES 1361 EH

H. Res. 1361

In the House of Representatives, U. S.,

September 23, 2008.

Whereas the United Nations is undertaking preparations for a 2009 Durban Review Conference on the implementation of commitments made as part of the 2001 World Conference Against Racism held in Durban, South Africa;

Whereas the 2001 World Conference Against Racism marked an important recognition of the historic wounds caused by slavery, colonialism, and related ongoing racism and racial discrimination, including the recognition of the transatlantic slave trade as a crime against humanity, and that people of African descent, people of Asian descent, and indigenous peoples who were victims of these acts continue to face discrimination and marginalization as a direct consequence;

Whereas the 2001 World Conference Against Racism also undertook historic efforts to recognize and address ongoing racism and racial discrimination against persons of African descent and members of Jewish, Muslim, caste, indigenous, Roma and Sinti, and other communities, as well as anti-migrant xenophobia and incitement to racial and religious hatred;

Whereas the 2001 World Conference Against Racism and its achievements were overshadowed and diminished as some participants in the conference, in particular during the Non-Governmental Organization Forum, called the `NGO Forum Against Racism' (NGO Forum), misused human rights language to promote hate, anti-Semitism, incitement, and divert the focus of the conference from problems within their own countries to a focus on Israel;

Whereas the NGO Forum produced a document called the `NGO Declaration' that contained abusive language, branding Israel an `apartheid state' that is guilty of `racist crimes against humanity';

Whereas the United States withdrew its delegation from the 2001 World Conference Against Racism, a decision that Secretary of State Colin Powell explained by stating that `you do not combat racism by conferences that produce declarations containing hateful language, some of which is a throwback to the days of `Zionism equals racism'; or supports the idea that we have made too much of the Holocaust; or suggests that apartheid exists in Israel; or that singles out only one country in the world--Israel--for censure and abuse';

Whereas the atmosphere of anti-Semitism at the NGO Forum was described as `hateful, even racist' by former High Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson and as `disgraceful' by Deputy Foreign Minister Aziz Pahad, of South Africa, who also stated that parts of the 2001 World Conference Against Racism were `hijacked and used by some with an anti-Israeli agenda to turn it into an anti-Semitic event';

Whereas the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, who served as Secretary General of the 2001 World Conference Against Racism, refused to accept the NGO Declaration, and some leading civil and human rights organizations and activists criticized the repugnant anti-Semitism and demonization of Israel in the NGO Forum, and the harassment of Jewish participants it engendered;

Whereas despite recognizing the Holocaust and increased anti-Semitism, the official government declaration adopted by the 2001 World Conference Against Racism, the `Durban Declaration and Program of Action', highlighted the `plight of the Palestinian people under foreign occupation', and in so doing singled out one regional conflict for discussion in a biased way, and wrongly implied that Israeli Government policies towards the Palestinians are motivated by racism;

Whereas the Human Rights Council agreed in Resolution 3/2 on December 8, 2006, that the 2009 Durban Review Conference would, like other United Nations review conferences, focus on countries' implementation of the many commitments to fight racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance contained in the official government Durban Declaration and Program of Action and that there will be `no renegotiation of the existing agreements contained therein';

Whereas at the first organizing session of the Durban Review Conference on August 27, 2007, in Geneva, Switzerland, Ambassador Masood Khan of Pakistan, speaking `on behalf of the OIC', described the concerns being expressed about the Durban Review Conference as a `smear campaign', and made it clear that the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) intends to make so-called `contemporary' forms of racism a centerpiece of the conference agenda, urging also that `[t]he Conference should move the spotlight on the continued plight of Palestinian people and non-recognition of their inalienable right to self-determination';

Whereas several OIC member states have also made clear their determination to go beyond the comprehensive list of items covered by the Durban Declaration and Program of Action to force consideration by the Durban Review Conference of a global blasphemy code that would legitimize arbitrary restrictions of freedom of thought, conscience and religion, and the freedoms of expression and opinion, all in the name of protecting religions from `defamation' and `blasphemy';

Whereas following the August 27, 2007, preparatory meeting for the Durban Review Conference in Geneva, Switzerland, several countries, including the United States, France, and Israel, stated that the Conference would not be worthwhile or worthy of support if it were not limited to a discussion of country commitments to combat racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, and related intolerance contained in the Durban Declaration and Plan of Action;

Whereas the High Commissioner for Human Rights was named Secretary-General of the 2009 Durban Review Conference;

Whereas in advance of determining the modalities, format, duration, and venue of the 2009 Durban Review Conference, the OIC and G-77 member states requested the United Nations General Assembly to fund a $7.2 million preparatory process of international, regional, and national meetings;

Whereas on November 28, 2007, 45 United Nations Member States, including the United States, joined together in the Third Committee (Resolution A/C/3/62/L.65/Rev.) to vote against a resolution that contradicted the 2009 Durban Review Conference preparatory committee consensus agreements about the framework of the Durban Review Conference, its scope, and sources of funding;

Whereas on December 21, 2007, 40 United Nations Member States, including the United States, joined together in the Fifth Committee (Resolution A/C.5/62/21) to vote against a resolution that authorized up to $6.8 million to fund the 2009 Durban Review Conference preparatory process;

Whereas the United States has decided to withhold from its 2008 funding for the United Nations an amount equivalent to the United States share of the United Nations Human Rights Council-administered preparatory process for the 2009 Durban Review Conference; and

Whereas since the 2001 World Conference Against Racism, the need for a credible global forum to review United Nations Member States' efforts to combat racism remains urgent given the continuing scourge of racism, discrimination and related violence, including against persons of African descent, Jewish, Muslim, caste, indigenous, Roma and Sinti, and other communities, anti-migrant xenophobia, and incitement to racial and religious hatred: Now, therefore, be it

    Resolved, That the House of Representatives--
      (1) acknowledges that the 2001 World Conference Against Racism marked an important recognition of the historic wounds caused by slavery, colonialism, and related ongoing racism and racial discrimination, including the recognition of the transatlantic slave trade as a crime against humanity, and that people of African descent, people of Asian descent, and indigenous peoples who were victims of these acts continue to face discrimination and marginalization as a direct consequence;
      (2) reaffirms its abiding commitment to the cause of combating continuing racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, and related intolerance in all its forms;
      (3) calls on the President and the Secretary of State to lead a high-level diplomatic effort to ensure that the Durban Review Conference focuses on the implementation by states of their commitments to combat racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance and to defeat any effort by states to use the forum to promote anti-Semitism or hatred against members of any group or to call into question the legitimacy of any state;
      (4) calls on the President to urge other heads of state to condition participation in the 2009 Durban Review Conference on concrete action by the United Nations and United Nations Member States to ensure that it is not a forum to demonize any group, or incite anti-Semitism, hatred, or violence against members of any group or to call into question the existence of any state;
      (5) calls on the Secretary of State to--
        (A) initiate United States policy into action by calling on counterparts, including the Government of Pakistan as the chair of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and the Government of Egypt as the head of the African Group, to insist that they take prompt and effective measures to ensure that the Durban Review Conference does not become a forum for anti-Semitism, incitement or hatred against members of any group or to call into question the existence of any state; and
        (B) demarche foreign capitals raising the concerns of Congress and to report to Congress on what steps the United States and its allies have taken to address these concerns;
      (6) commends all governments, including those of the United States, France, Canada, Israel, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands that have declared their intentions not to participate in any United Nations Durban Review Conference that sidesteps scrutiny of country commitments to combat racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, and related intolerance, and that promotes hate, undermines human rights standards, and damages the credibility of the United Nations itself;
      (7) commends the countries that joined the United States, including the member states of the European Union, Albania, Andorra, Australia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Croatia, Georgia, Israel, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, San Marino, Serbia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Ukraine, Canada, and the Republic of Korea, in voting to uphold earlier United Nations consensus agreements that established the scope and funding of the 2009 Durban Review Conference process;
      (8) urges all United Nations Member States not to support a 2009 Durban Review Conference process that fails to adhere to established human rights standards and to reject an agenda that incites hatred against any group in the guise of criticism of a particular government or that seeks to forge a global blasphemy code;
      (9) commends the diverse civil society organizations that have joined together to learn from the shortcomings of the 2001 World Conference Against Racism, and to work together in a spirit of solidarity and mutual respect toward a 2009 Durban Review Conference that rejects hatred in all its forms;
      (10) reaffirms that, as recognized by Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, `Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, [and] to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance';
      (11) urges all states to implement their commitments to combat racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance to secure just treatment and the realization of universal human rights for all as enshrined in international human rights instruments, in particular the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;
      (12) notes that the Human Rights Council agreed in Resolution 3/2 on December 8, 2006, that the 2009 Durban Review Conference would, like other United Nations review conferences, focus on countries' implementation of the many commitments to fight racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance contained in the official government Durban Declaration and Program of Action and that there will be `no renegotiation of the existing agreements contained therein';
      (13) recognizes the purposeful attempts of some countries to prevent a focus on ongoing racism by utilizing inflammatory language, employing divisive tactics and strategies, fostering an atmosphere of anti-Semitism and otherwise deviating from the commitments made at the 2001 World Conference Against Racism in order to divert the 2009 Durban Review Conference from the important goal of eradicating global racism;
      (14) calls on United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon to publicly urge the Human Rights Council to adhere to its mandate and to the high responsibility and expectations placed on it, and asks him to personally intervene to refocus the 2009 Durban Review Conference efforts on the review of what United Nations Member States have done to fulfill their commitments to combat racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, and on concrete action to fight racism, anti-Semitism, and all forms of hatred, intolerance, and violence; and
      (15) calls on the High Commissioner for Human Rights to urge United Nations Member States to adhere to the agreed framework of the 2009 Durban Review Conference and its previously agreed upon goals and parameters and to urge Member States of the preparatory committee to return to decision making by consensus.